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after  Ten  Years 
TEN  YEARS AGO, in March 1973, the United States and other nations 
abandoned efforts to  maintain the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange  rates  among  the  major  currencies.  The  period  of largely  market- 
determined  (floating)  exchange  rates  between the dollar  and  other  major 
currencies  began.  I This fundamental  change in the international  mone- 
tary system was ratified  by the Rambouillet  Summit in 1975 and the 
Second Amendment  of the International  Monetary  Fund's Articles of 
Agreement  in 1978. 
The  debate  about  whether  exchange  rates  among  the major  currencies 
ought  to be fixed,  freely  floating,  or somewhere  in  between  has  continued 
with considerable  intensity. Strongly  held  but sharply  contrasting  views 
on how  exchange  rates  behave  and  interact  with  other  economic  variables 
have been central to the debate, but differing interests and values 
regarding  the proper  role of governments  in financial  markets  have also 
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1. The Canadian  dollar  had been floating  since May 1970;  the pound sterling,  since 
June  1972;  and  the yen, since February  1973.  Transitional  floats  were  permitted  on several 
occasions in the later  years of the Bretton  Woods  period,  but  the change  in U.S. policy in 
March  1973  marked  the end of that  period. 
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been important.2  The strongest advocates of fixed exchange rates, 
proponents  of the reestablishment  of a gold standard,  and the strongest 
advocates of a free float, the monetarists, tend to share a desire to 
eliminate  any discretionary  element  in economic policy. Those who see 
a role for discretion  generally  take intermediate  positions, but also vary 
widely in how much  flexibility  they would  permit  in exchange  rates. 
In this paper we review what the ten years of experience with a 
floating  exchange  rate  can reveal about  how exchange  rates  behave. We 
conclude that no simple existing theory explains the behavior  of rates 
well enough to provide a strong case for any mechanical  approach  to 
exchange rate management. Uncertainty about how exchange rates 
behave over periods as long as several years is itself one of the most 
important  facts to consider  in choosing among  alternative  strategies  for 
managing  exchange rates and, more generally, in formulating  macro- 
economic policies in an interdependent  world. 
The Transition from Fixed to Floating Exchange Rates 
During  the late 1960s  and early 1970s,  the system of fixed exchange 
rates established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 showed 
2. The  strong  presumption  underlying  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  that  free  multilateral 
trade  requires  fixed  exchange  rates, was based  in large  part  on the dislocations  accompa- 
nying  the interwar  experiences  with  flexible  rates.  The classic indictment  of the flexibility 
of exchange rates during  that period is by Ragnar  Nurkse in International  Currency 
Experience: Lessons  of the Inter-war Period (Geneva: League of Nations,  1944). Milton 
Friedman's  influential  article  is a response  to that  indictment.  See Friedman,  "The Case 
for Flexible Exchange Rates," Essays in Positive Economics (University of Chicago 
Press, 1953),  pp. 157-203.  Notable later contributions  to the debate are Egon Sohmen, 
Flexible  Exchange  Rates (University  of Chicago  Press, 1969);  J. E. Meade,  "The  Case  for 
Variable  Exchange  Rates," ThreeBanks  Review,  vol.27 (September  1955),  pp.3-27; Harry 
G. Johnson,  "The  Case  for Flexible  Exchange  Rates, 1969,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St. 
Louis Review, vol. 51 (June 1969),  pp. 12-24; Charles  P. Kindleberger,  "The Case for 
Fixed Exchange Rates, 1969," in Federal  Reserve Bank of Boston, The  International 
Adjustment  Mechanism,  Conference  Series 2 (FRBB, 1970),  pp. 93-108; and Robert  A. 
Mundell,  "Uncommon  Arguments  for Common  Currencies,"  in Harry  G. Johnson  and 
Alexander K. Swoboda,  eds.,  The Economics  of Common Cuirrencies  (London: Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1973),  pp. 114-32. Recent assessments  include  Jacques  R. Artus  and John 
H. Young, "Fixed and Flexible Exchange  Rates:  A Renewal  of the Debate," IMF Staff 
Papers, vol. 26 (December 1979), pp. 654-98; and Morris Goldstein, Have Flexible 
Exchange  Rates  Handicapped  Macroeconomic  Policy?  Special  Papers in International 
Economics, 14  (Princeton  University,  International  Finance  Section,  June 1980). Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  3 
increasing  signs of stress. Despite widespread  capital  controls, capital 
flows and  consequent  intervention  requirements  expanded  to levels that 
alarmed  policymakers.  Imbalances  in the current  account seemed to be 
giving off  signals of  fundamental disequilibrium  with growing fre- 
quency. Monetary  authorities  increasingly  observed  situations  in which 
the monetary policy they believed was appropriate  from a domestic 
standpoint  and the policy that would bring  about  external  balance  were 
in conflict. Par value changes and periods during which countries 
permitted  their  currencies  to float  became  more  common.  Two currency 
realignments  in December 1971 and February 1973, involving a net 
depreciation  of the dollar,  failed  to stem  mounting  pressure  on the dollar. 
It was against  this background  that  the decision to float  the exchange 
rate was made in March 1973. For nearly a year afterward  the United 
States continued to advocate the establishment  of a modified  Bretton 
Woods system of fixed but adjustable  par values in the Committee  of 
Twenty on the Reform of the International  Monetary System. The 
turbulence  in international  money markets  following  the first  oil shock 
then persuaded  officials in the United States and other countries that 
Humpty  Dumpty  could not be put back together  again-at  least for the 
time  being. U.S. negotiating  efforts  shifted  to legitimizing  and  establish- 
ing  rules  for  conducting  a float.  These  efforts  culminated  in  the agreement 
at the Rambouillet  Summit  in November 1975. 
A growing  number  of economists, particularly  in the United States, 
had been advocating  a shift to flexible  rates for some time. Expediency 
in the face of  an increasingly uncontrollable situation, rather than 
economic theory, was apparently  the strongest consideration  in the 
initial  decision to float; but the theoretical  arguments  did influence  the 
decisions to continue  support  of floating  rates. 
The advocates of floating  exchange  rates made  four  principal  claims. 
First, price-adjusted  or real exchange rates would be maintained  at 
relatively  constant values by stabilizing  speculation  and would change 
mainly  in response to shifts or trends  in the equilibrium  terms of trade 
between economies. Second, external balance would be better main- 
tained than under fixed rates. Imbalances in the overall balance of 
payments  (the official  settlements  balance)  would  not arise  by definition; 
and  current  accounts  would  be kept  roughly  in line with  the fundamental 
positions of countries as net suppliers  or demanders  of capital, deter- 
mined by wealth accumulation  and investment  potential. Third, econ- 4  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
omies would  be relatively  insulated  against  macroeconomic  shocks  from 
abroad,  and authorities  would enjoy greater  independence  of monetary 
policies to pursue domestic stabilization  goals. And fourth, national 
policymakers  would find  it unnecessary  to impose restrictions  on trade 
and capital  flows for macroeconomic  reasons, and existing restrictions 
could be discarded,  thus enhancing  the efficiency  of resource  allocation 
in the world  economy. 
Policymakers  in the United States and  abroad  each saw an additional 
advantage  from floating  rates. For both, a floating  dollar  was seen as a 
way of escaping  the asymmetry  in the role  of the dollar  under  the Bretton 
Woods system-the  so-called "n-plus first" currency problem. This 
asymmetry  was evident in two aspects of the way the system worked. 
Under the Bretton Woods system, other countries bore the principal 
obligation  to maintain  their  currencies  within  fixed margins  vis a vis the 
dollar through the purchase and sale of dollar assets. But they also 
enjoyed greater  freedom  to choose par values against  the dollar  and to 
change them from time to time; and the effective or weighted-average 
par  value of the dollar  resulted  from  the par  values chosen by others. 
Foreign authorities had become increasingly  concerned about the 
consequences of the first aspect of the asymmetry:  the privilege that 
they felt the system bestowed on the United States to follow expansion- 
ary policies unconstrained  by reserve losses, particularly  as U.S. fiscal 
deficits  and monetary  expansion  began  to be associated  with  the unpop- 
ular  war  in Vietnam.  These foreign  authorities  saw themselves as facing 
an  unpleasant  choice between accepting  indefinitely  large  accumulations 
of dollar reserves  or getting in step with U.S.  policy.3  Foreign official 
holders of dollars were paid interest and sometimes were given an 
exchange rate guarantee  on their dollar investments, but they did not 
see this as balancing  the scales. 
At about the same time there was growing distress among U.S. 
authorities  about the consequences of the second aspect of the asym- 
metry-the  difficulty  of achieving  an appropriate  effective value of the 
dollar. Changing  the value of the dollar  entailed  a systemic negotiation, 
3.  One statement of this view appears in Otmar Emminger, The D-Mark in the Conflict 
between  Internal  and External Equilibrium, 1948-75,  Essays  in International Finance, 
122 (Princeton University,  International Finance Section,  June 1977). Jeffrey R.  Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  5 
which had proven difficult  and tedious when undertaken  at the Smith- 
sonian  in  December  1971  and  again  in  February  1973.  Moreover,  because 
of its special role as a reserve currency, devaluation  of the dollar  was 
thought  to threaten  the stability  of the system. 
Not all economists were enthusiastic about the move to floating 
exchange rates, and many, if not most, policymakers  had reservations. 
Skeptics were most numerous  outside the United States, where there 
was less confidence  in  the self-equilibration  of markets.  They  had  several 
areas of concern: (1) Speculative  capital  movements  would be destabi- 
lizing and would lead to wide swings in exchange rates. (2) National 
policies, once freed of the discipline  of fixed rates, would be less stable 
and, on the whole, more inclined to accommodate  inflation.  Policies, 
together  with frequent  speculative  disturbances  to rates, would tend to 
result  in greater  divergence  and higher  average  levels of inflation  rates. 
(3)  Exchange  rates  that  were not associated  with  underlying  fundamental 
developments would induce undesirable fluctuations in current ac- 
counts, domestic output, employment, and inflation.  (4) False signals 
from  exchange  rates  and  exchange  rate  uncertainty,  per  se, were  thought 
to distort and inhibit  trade and investment  with adverse consequences 
for the allocation  of resources in the world  economy. (5) Trade  barriers 
and restrictions  on capital  flows would proliferate  as officials  sought  to 
protect their economies from the destabilizing  effects of exchange rate 
changes. 
Problems in Evaluating the Period of Floating Rates 
The period of floating exchange rates has been marked by great 
instability  in the world economy and relatively  poor economic perfor- 
mance when compared  with the 1960s, and even when compared  with 
the 1970-72 period when the Bretton Woods system was becoming 
unworkable.  Table 1 highlights  the general  decline in economic perfor- 
mance. But one cannot decide the argument  in favor of the opponents 
of floating  on the basis of such casual observations. On the one hand, 
one must keep in mind the problems  with the Bretton Woods system 
that led to its abandonment. On the other, the past ten years are 
distinguished  from the 1960s in a number  of respects other than the 6  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 1.  Economic  Performance  of the OECD Economies, 
Selected Periods, 1960-82 
Percent 
Measure  1960-69  1970-72  1973-82 
Average  real GNP growth  rate  4.95  4.12  2.45 
Average  inflation  rate  2.84  5.20  9.88 
Average  unemployment  ratea  2.73  3.40  5.34 
Source:  Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  OECD Econonmic  Outlook, various issues. 
a.  Data on total OECD unemployment  commences  in 1964. 
exchange rate regime. These differences  include the following:  (1) It is 
unlikely  that growth  in the economies of continental  Europe  and Japan 
could have been sustained at the rapid  pace of the 1950s  and 1960s, a 
period that showed in part a catching  up after the Second World  War. 
(2) The period  of floating  rates  inherited  the international  disequilibrium 
and  inflationary  tendencies  that had  built  up gradually  during  the 1960s. 
(3) International  trade grew in relative importance  and Eurocurrency 
markets  were developing that were relatively  free of direct control by 
authorities. Consequently  the exposure of all economies to economic 
and financial  disturbances  from abroad  was potentially  greater in the 
1970s. (4) The major  oil market  shocks of 1973-74 and 1979  disturbed 
the world economy much more than any events that occurred in the 
1960s. 
Still another complication arises because the domestic monetary 
policies and  exchange  rate  policies that  have  been pursued  have changed 
from  time to time and  have often departed  from  the strict  prescription  of 
the advocates of floating. The unsatisfactory  performance  of national 
economies and the adjustment  to the needs and possibilities  of floating 
exchange  rates  led to considerable  experimentation  with  monetary  policy 
strategies  in the 1970s,  especially  attempts  to use monetary  targets  more 
or less stringently. 
Moreover, exchange rates have not been permitted  to float cleanly 
since March 1973, nor have exchange rate policies in any country 
remained  settled for any extended period. Intervention  strategies  have 
differed  among countries and over time, ranging  from free floating,  to 
short-run smoothing, to  rather heavy intervention directed toward 
achieving  a specified  exchange rate. Capital  controls  have been a factor 
influencing  exchange  rates  on at least some occasions, although  controls Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  7 
have been a lesser influence  as time has passed.4  Domestic monetary 
policies have ranged  from benign neglect of exchange rates to giving 
exchange  rates  considerable  weight  in setting  interest  rates  or monetary 
growth  rates, and European  countries  have gone through  several stages 
of experimentation  with maintaining  narrow  margins  among  their cur- 
rencies. 
Thus, sorting out how harsh a judgment the floating rate regime 
deserves and whether there is a better way is difficult,  even after ten 
years. What can be done, however, is to take stock of what has been 
learned  about how floating  exchange rates behave. Differing  views on 
whether  floating  exchange rates are beneficial, what domestic policies 
are appropriate  with a floating  exchange rate, and whether exchange 
rates  can and should  be managed  more  tightly,  independent  of domestic 
policies, follow from  different  models of exchange  rate  determination. 
The theory of exchange rate determination  has undergone  consider- 
able development  over the past ten years as simple  models were found 
to explain current experience poorly and the lengthening  time series 
introduced new phenomena for theorists to explain. One important 
question is how the predictions and policy prescriptions  of the early 
advocates  of floating  should  be modified,  given the evolution  of theoret- 
ical understanding  of exchange rate  determination.  A second important 
question is how complacent economists should be about the current 
understanding  of exchange  rates  and  about  any  set of policy prescriptions 
that  depends  on a particular  model. 
The following section of this paper reviews the behavior of several 
important  exchange  rates (the dollar-deutsche  mark,  the dollar-yen,  the 
dollar-pound  sterling,  and a weighted-average  rate  for the dollar  against 
six major currencies), investigates the challenges that this behavior 
posed for theory, and  describes  the evolution  of mainstream  theoretical 
views during  the ten years of floating  exchange  rates  from 1973  to 1983. 
A subsequent  section takes a statistical  look at how much  of the variance 
of these exchange  rates can be related  systematically  to other variables 
4.  Capital  controls were pervasive at the beginning  of the floating  rate period. The 
United  States,  Germany,  and  the United  Kingdom  have  lifted  their  controls,  and  Japan  has 
substantially  liberalized  capital  flows;  these actions support  at least one prediction  made 
by the advocates of floating  rates. Only France and Italy, among the large industrial 
countries, now use capital controls as an important  short-run  policy tool, and these 
countries  have accepted  fixed  parity  obligations  within  the European  Monetary  System. 8  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
that appear  in the models. The central  restrictions  of the models from 
the standpoint  of exchange  rate  policy are  then examined.  A concluding 
section presents  an assessment of what economists  do and  do not know 
about  exchange  rates  and  what  policies are defensible  or indefensible  in 
light  of this knowledge. 
Exchange Rate Behavior and the Development 
of Exchange Rate Theory 
The theory of exchange rate determination  has evolved largely  from 
an asset view of exchange markets; that is, models have been built 
around the determinants  of net outside supplies of stocks of assets 
denominated  in different  currencies  and the demands  for them. Prices 
in asset  markets are viewed as  adjusting freely, and hence stock 
equilibrium  is assumed to be achieved very quickly, if not instanta- 
neously, following  a disturbance.  Expectations  are seen to play  a central 
role in the determination  of equilibrium  and, reflecting  the fashion in 
macroeconomics  more generally, the rational  expectations hypothesis 
is the norm. Goods markets  are important  in varying  degrees, although 
they are generally  kept in the background.  At a minimum,  they tie down 
long-run  expectations  and  influence  the demands  for assets. 
THE  FLEXIBLE-PRICE  MONETARY  MODEL 
The model that provides the strongest  case for the advantages  of the 
system of floating  exchange rates, the flexible-price  monetary  model, is 
also the simplest  model.S  It presents  the exchange  rate, S, as the relative 
5. For some early contributions  to the monetary  approach  see Rudiger  Dornbusch, 
"The Theory  of Flexible  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and Macroeconomic  Policy," Scandi- 
navian Journal  of Economics,  vol.  78, no.  2 (1976), pp. 255-75;  Jacob A.  Frenkel,  "A 
Monetary  Approach  to the Exchange  Rate:  Doctrinal  Aspects and  Empirical  Evidence," 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,  vol. 78, no. 2 (1976), pp. 200-24; and Michael Mussa, 
"The Exchange  Rate, The Balance  of Payments  and  Monetary  and  Fiscal Policy under  a 
Regime  of Controlled  Floating,  " Scandinavian  Journal  ofEconomics,  vol. 78, no.2 (1976), 
pp. 229-48. Early  empirical  evidence  was provided  by Lance Girton  and  Don Roper, "A 
Monetary  Model  of Exchange  Market  Pressure  Applied  to the Postwar  Canadian  Experi- 
ence,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  67 (September  1977), pp. 537-48;  John F. 0. 
Bilson, "The Monetary  Approach  to the Exchange  Rate: Some Empirical  Evidence," 
IMF  Staff  Papers, vol. 25 (March  1978),  pp. 48-75;  and  Robert  J. Hodrick,  "An Empirical 
Analysis  of the Monetary  Approach  to the  Determination  of the Exchange  Rate,"  in Jacob 
A.  Frenkel  and Harry G. Johnson,  eds.,  The Economics  of Exchange  Rates:  Selected 
Studies  (Addison-Wesley,  1978),  pp. 97-116. Jeffrey  R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  9 
price  of two monies, Mand M*  (an  asterisk  indicating  a foreign  country), 
each supplied as the liability of a central bank and demanded  by the 
residents of one country. The condition for zero excess demands in 
money markets  determines  price levels in the two respective  countries, 
P and P*. The assumption  of one tradable  good in the world implies a 
constant real exchange rate reflecting purchasing  power parity, and 
hence a path for the nominal  exchange rate determined  by the paths of 
money supplies  and  outputs, Yand Y*,  in the two economies. The model 
has an equation  for domestic  monetary  equilibrium, 
Mt=  m(rt)PtYt; 
for purchasing  power parity, 
Pt =  StPt*;t 
and  for uncovered  interest  rate  parity, 
St =  rt  -  rt* 
where r is the nominal  interest  rate, e denotes an expected value, and a 
lowercase rendering  of a level variable  denotes its percentage  change, 
computed as the difference in natural  logarithms.  In a small-country 
model the foreign price level and nominal interest rate, P* and r*, 
respectively, are taken  as exogenously  given. 
The uncovered interest-rate parity condition implies that assets 
denominated  in  different  currencies  are  viewed  by  international  investors 
as perfect substitutes in portfolios. With perfect asset substitutability 
and rational  expectations, the fundamental  behavior  of exchange rates 
is governed by purchasing  power parity. If one country has a higher 
expected monetary growth rate and consequently a higher expected 
inflation  rate, assets denominated  in its currency will carry a higher 
interest rate that is exactly offset by an expected depreciation  of its 
exchange rate. So uncovered  interest rate parity  implies that expected 
rates of  return on interest-bearing  assets denominated in different 
currencies are eciualized.6  Since in this model the rate of exchange 
6.  One related proposition  that was settled rather  early and has stood the test of 
time  is that  covered  interest  arbitrage  (the equality  of the annualized  forward  premium  or 
discount and the interest differential)  holds extremely  well for assets having  the same 
characteristics  except  for  currency  of denomination  (for  example,  Eurocurrency  deposits). 
This implies  that  forward  markets  need not be modeled  explicitly.  It also implies  that  the 
uncovered interest arbitrage  condition is equivalent  to the condition  that the forward 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
depreciation  is just the difference in inflation  rates between the two 
countries,  this proposition  holds whether  returns  are  measured  in either 
country's  currency  or  in real  terms.  The real  interest  rate  in the domestic 
economy is tied to the exogenous real  rate  in the foreign  economy. 
Although  the current  account  does not appear  explicitly  in this model, 
the model is not inconsistent with surpluses  and deficits in the current 
account financed  by net accumulation  of cross-border  claims  and  liabil- 
ities of a nonmonetary  character.  However, imbalances  in the current 
account  would  reflect  differences  in propensities  to save and  investment 
opportunities-considerations that are kept in the background  and are 
assumed  not to be influenced  by exchange  market  developments.  They 
would influence  exchange rates only to the extent that they altered  the 
expected future  path  of output. 
The diagram  opposite illustrates  the characteristic  responses of the 
nominal  and real exchange rates to a one-time increase in the money 
supply and to a permanent  increase in the growth rate of the money 
supply  for the flexible-price  monetary  model. Prices and interest rates 
in the rest of the world  are taken as given. The time paths for variables 
in the diagram  assume  perfect  foresight  by economic agents, except that 
the two policy changes are unanticipated.  A one-time increase in the 
domestic money stock occurs at time tl, resulting  in a jump in the price 
level and a rise in the price of foreign exchange (a depreciation  of the 
home currency)  to new equilibrium  values. The real exchange rate is 
unaffected.  An increase  in the rate  of growth  of the money supply  occurs 
at time t2. The rate of price increase rises immediately  by the same 
amount  as the increase in the growth  rate of the money supply, and the 
exchange  rate begins rising  at the same rate, that is, the home currency 
exchange  rate  is equal  to the expected  future  spot rate, which  provides  an alternative  and 
essentially  equivalent  way of testing  the uncovered  interest  parity  condition.  These tests 
are discussed below. Interest rates in different  national  money markets  have at times 
deviated  from  corresponding  Eurocurrency  market  interest  rates  and  hence  from  covered 
interest  parity  when capital  controls  have been tight.  Tax requirements,  reserve  require- 
ments, and risk considerations  also influence  covered interest  parity  deviations  just as 
they lead to interest rate differentials  within national  markets,  but for a wide range  of 
instruments  these differences  are relatively  small. For evidence on the covered interest 
arbitrage  condition, see Jacob A. Frenkel  and Richard  M. Levich, "Covered Interest 
Arbitrage: Unexploited  Profits?" Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  83 (April 1975), pp. 
325-38; Frank  McCormick,  "Comment,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 87 (April 
1979),  pp. 411-17; and Richard  C. Marston, "Interest Arbitrage  in the Euro-currency 
Markets,"  European  Economic  Review,  vol. 7 (January  1976),  pp. 1-13. Jeffrey R.  Shafer and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  11 
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depreciates. The exchange rate and price level also jump at time t2 
because the demand  for money depends on the nominal  interest rate. 
But even so, the real  exchange  rate  is unaffected. 
EXCHANGE  RATE  BEHAVIOR:  MARCH  1973  TO  LATE  1975 
By late 1975  it was becoming  clear that purchasing  power parity  was 
not well maintained  and that changes over time in real exchange rates 
were much larger than those under fixed rates.7 Figure 1 shows the 
behavior of the nominal and real exchange rates over the fixed and 
7.  Econometric  studies  of purchasing  power  parity  include  Isard's  study  using  disag- 
gregated  price  data. See Peter  Isard,  "How Far  Can  We Push 'The  Law of One Price?' " 
American  Economic Review, vol. 67 (December 1977), pp. 942-48. See also Paul R. 
Krugman,  "Purchasing  Power Parity  and Exchange  Rates: Another  Look at the Evi- 
dence,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  vol.  8 (August  1978), pp. 397-407;  Hans 
Genberg,  "Purchasing  Power  Parity  Under  Fixed  and  Flexible  Exchange  Rates,"  Journal 
of International  Economics, vol. 8 (May 1978),  pp. 247-76; and Irving  B. Kravis and 
Robert  E. Lipsey, "Price  Behavior  in  the  Light  of Balance  of Payments  Theories,"  Journal 
of International Economics,  vol. 8 (May 1978), pp. 193-246. 12  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Figure 1. Nominal and Real Exchange  Ratesa 
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Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bank of New  York, international macro data base. 
a.  Quarterly data. Price adjustments use consumer price indexes.  The effective  U.S.  dollar is the weighted average 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
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currency per dollar). Weights are from the International Monetary Fund's multilateral exchange  rate model and are 
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floating  rate periods  for the mark,  yen, and pound  as measured  against 
the dollar  and a weighted-average  value of the dollar  against six major 
currencies-' 
When  inflation  rates  diverged  widely, as they did between  the United 
States and the United Kingdom  from mid-1972  to 1977, the exchange 
rate showed some tendency to change over time so as to contain 
deviations from purchasing  power parity.9  Nevertheless, most of the 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations  in the period from March 1973  to 
September 1975 were reflected in movements of real exchange rates. 
These relatively  short-term  exchange  rate  swings  were of great  concern 
to many at the time, but they shriveled  almost to insignificance  when 
compared  with the large  sustained  swings  that  came later. 
Exchange  rate  movements  have often  been analyzed  and  their  causes 
debated in terms of episodes that appear  to be associated with specific 
events. Indeed, until a rather  lengthy data record could be compiled, 
more  formal  statistical  techniques  were of little  value. After  the decision 
to float exchange rates, the dollar continued  to depreciate  for several 
months  in both  nominal  and  real  terms,  especially  against  the mark.  This 
depreciation  was widely explained  as a continuation  of the adjustment 
to the misalignment  of the dollar  and the mark  that had built up during 
the Bretton Woods period, but some market  observers expressed con- 
cern that speculation against the dollar was feeding on itself and was 
carrying  the dollar to unrealistically  low levels. The dollar ultimately 
stabilized  and recovered somewhat  after  July 1973,  but not before U.S. 
authorities  had tempered  their policy of benign  neglect and intervened 
to resist the slide. 
The dollar strengthened  against  most currencies  following  the Arab 
oil embargo  of October 1973  and  the quadrupling  of oil prices at the end 
of the year. The pound  was also remarkably  strong  in the wake of the oil 
shock, considering the sharp increase in wages and prices that had 
occurred  in the United Kingdom.  The yen weakened  sharply. 
8. The six currencies  are  the Canadian  dollar,  French  franc,  deutsche  mark,  lira, yen, 
and  pound  sterling. 
9. While  the tendency  for  nominal  exchange  rate  changes  to offset  differential  changes 
in price levels has been weak in the current  period  of floating  rates, it has been more 
marked  when  nominal  inflation  differentials  have  been very large.  See the evidence  on the 
German  hyperinflation  in  Jacob  A. Frenkel,  "Exchange  Rates,  Prices,  and  Money:  Lessons 
from  the 1920s,  "  American Economic Review, vol. 70  (May  1980,  Papers andProceedings, 
1979), pp. 235-42. Jeffrey R.  Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  15 
Three  reasons were advanced  to explain  these adjustments  to the oil 
shock. First, the United States appeared  to be following  a relatively  less 
accommodating  course than  other  countries  after  the inflationary  impe- 
tus of the increases in oil prices. An explosion of the money supply, 
wages, and prices in Japan  stood out by contrast. Second, at that time 
the United States was relatively less dependent on imported  oil than 
other countries. And third,  the current  account surpluses  accumulated 
by OPEC  members  were expected to be invested  predominantly  in dollar 
and  pound  assets. 
The first  reason  was roughly  consistent with the flexible-price  mone- 
tary model. The second could be reconciled with this model by recog- 
nizing  that  large  real  disturbances  could  permanently  alter  the  purchasing 
power parity relation, even if monetary  disturbances  could not. Thus 
considerable  effort was devoted to assessing how much the oil shock 
could  be expected  to alter  permanently  countries'  competitive  positions. 
The final consideration-portfolio preferences of OPEC investors 
among  nonmoney  assets denominated  in different  currencies-was  not 
allowed for in the monetary  model. But the shock was unprecedented 
and  therefore  did not necessarily  discredit  the claim  of the flexible-price 
monetary  model to explain a majority  of the persistent movements in 
nominal  exchange  rates. Broad  capital  controls  had  been inherited  from 
the Bretton  Woods period  and  could also be argued  to have affected  the 
range  and  relative  attractiveness  of various  currencies  for  the investment 
of OPEC  financial  wealth.  U.S. authorities  took  advantage  of the strength 
of the dollar  to lift all controls on capital  flows out of the United States 
in January  1974.  This represented  a further  step toward  allowing  rates 
to be determined  by market  forces. But Germany  continued  controls  on 
inflows,  the United Kingdom  on outflows,  and  Japan  on both. 
In mid-1974  one could look back  on the first  fifteen  months  of floating 
and  be somewhat  complacent  that  the system of floating  exchange  rates 
would function roughly as predicted by the flexible-price monetary 
model despite the movements  of real  exchange  rates that  had occurred. 
The major  developments seemed explainable  by continued  adjustment 
to the disequilibrium  built up during  the Bretton  Woods period  and by 
the unprecedented oil shock. Moreover, it was not surprising  that 
markets  were taking  some time to adjust  to the new environment.  The 
continued prevalence of capital controls meant that the conditions 
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But the skeptics could note that the slide of the dollar  in 1973  had only 
been reversed  after concerted intervention  by the central  bank. In any 
event, the next episode posed a greater  challenge  to the theory. 
The United States maintained  a relatively restrictive  policy stance 
through  most of 1974  as the U.S. economy experienced  a less marked 
drop in output than most other countries in the wake of the oil shock. 
Then  in the fall of that  year  a sharp  recession began  in the United  States. 
Short-term  interest rates on dollar assets fell relative to average rates 
abroad and particularly relative to  rates for the mark. The dollar 
weakened, declining  by 10 percent  against  the mark  and 5 percent  on a 
weighted-average  basis. Adjusting for prices, the weighted-average 
depreciation  was even sharper,  and against the mark  it was nearly as 
large.  The  drop  in  the  dollar  ultimately  drove  U. S. authorities  to intervene 
once again.  Finally  the slide  came  to an  end  and  a sharp  rebound  occurred 
with the strong recovery in the United States in 1975:2. Short-term 
interest rates on dollar instruments  rose relative to rates on the mark 
and yen counterparts  while U.S. inflation  was declining  more rapidly 
than the lower inflation  rate in Germany.  By September  the dollar  had 
recovered  from  its earlier  decline. 
Figure  2 shows the three real bilateral  exchange rates, together  with 
the corresponding  three-month  interest differential  and smoothed-out 
inflation  rate  differential.  The  association  between  changes  in  the interest 
rate and in the exchange rate in late 1974  and early 1975  is apparent  for 
the mark-dollar  rate. Some parallel  movements  can also be seen at other 
times and in other currencies, especially when interest rates move 
counter to inflation  rates. But the relation  is not close. Nevertheless, 
changes  in the interest  rate  played  a prominent  role  in day-to-day  market 
commentary.  And the tendency, evident in late 1974 and 1975, for a 
rising nominal interest rate to be associated with a strong currency, 
contrary  to the prediction  of the flexible-price  monetary  model, stimu- 
lated interest in finding  a theoretical connection. The lack of a close 
correspondence  between money growth  and exchange  rate movements 
in the early period of floating rates also suggested the need for a 
modification  of the theory. 
THE  STICKY-PRICE  MONETARY  MODEL 
The  principal  theoretical  response  to these observations  was renewed 
recognition of the importance of price stickiness for understanding Jeffrey  R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  17 
changes  in the exchange  rates  among  major  currencies  in the 1970s.  This 
"Keynesian" assumption had fallen into disfavor in the inflationary 
environment  of the early part of the decade, but it was revived as a 
central assumption of the dynamic sticky-price monetary model of 
exchange rate determination.  As developed by Dornbusch,  this model 
predicted that, following an unanticipated  monetary  disturbance,  ex- 
change rate expectations would deviate from purchasing  power parity 
for as long as it took goods prices to adjust  fully to the new monetary 
conditions and goods market  clearing  to be restored.10  Moreover, the 
exchange rate could (depending  on the parameter  values of the model) 
overshoot  its long-run  path. 
The monetary equilibrium  condition and perfect substitutability  of 
nonmoney  assets were retained  from  the flexible-price  monetary  model. 
Although  goods markets  might adjust slowly, asset markets  were still 
assumed  to clear continuously.  Purchasing  power  parity  became  a long- 
run  tendency since the equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  was unaffected  by 
purely  monetary  factors. The new elements  were an equation  determin- 
ing the inflation  rate-a  stylized  expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve- 
and an IS locus incorporating  the relative price of foreign and home 
goods and  the real  interest  rate.  Work  with  this  model  has  mainly  focused 
on the case of perfectly  foreseen changes  in exchange  rates. 
A sticky-price  monetary  model,  then,  has  an  equation  for  the  condition 
of monetary  equilibrium, 
Mt =  m(rt)  PtYt; 
for the IS locus, 
Yt =  y(StP* /Pt,  rt -  pe); 
for the expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve, 
P  =  g(Yt  -  Y) +  v; 
and  for uncovered  interest  parity, 
Se  =  rt - r* 
10. The  Dornbusch  model  presented  in "Expectations  and  Exchange  Rate  Dynamics," 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (December 1976),  pp. 1161-76,  extended earlier 
work  by Robert  A. Mundell,  International  Economics  (Macmillan,  1968)  and J. Marcus 
Fleming,  "Domestic  Financial  Policies  under  Fixed  and  Floating  Exchange  Rates," IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 9 (November 1962),  pp. 369-80. Other  important  work in the sticky- 
price  tradition  includes  Michael  Mussa,  "A Model  of Exchange  Rate  Dynamics,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (February  1982),  pp. 74-104. 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Figure 2.  Real Exchange  Rates, Short-Term  Interest Rates, 
and Inflationa 
Mark  per dollar  Interest  and inflation  differential 
(index,  March  1973 = 100)  (percent) 
150  15 
Germany 
1000  0  S 
,,  .  Interest  d~~infferetion  difreta 
0 
65  _'^ ,""''  _  -5 
1975  1980 
Yen  per dollar  Interest  and inflation  differential 
(index,  March  1973 =  100)  (percent) 
150  15 
Japan  Interest  differential  r 
10 
100  Real  exchange  rate 
0 
65  -5 
ation  differential 
, 
I  ,  ,  |  I  I  | 
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~15 
1975  1980 Jeffrey R.  Shafer and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  19 
Figure 2 (continued) 
Pound  per dollar  Interest  and inflation  differential 
(index,  March  1973 = 100)  (percent) 
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Source:  Monthly data. Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York, international macro date base. 
a.  The  interest  rates are based  on  the  three-month  interbank rate for Germany,  the  sixty-day  Treasury  bill for 
Japan, the ninety-one-day  Treasury bill for the United Kingdom, and ninety-day bankers' acceptances  for the United 
States.  The  inflation  rate  is  measured  as  a  twelve-month  centered  moving  average  of  consumer  price  changes. 
Differentials  are calculated  as U.S.  rates minus foreign rates. 
where the rest of the world is taken as exogenous. The actual and 
expected rates of change in the exchange rate are the same, except at 
the  instant  when  an  unanticipated  disturbance  occurs.  Then  the exchange 
rate  jumps to a new path. Note that  the Phillips  curve equation  requires 
that, for a stable long-run  equilibrium, Y, converge to  Y. Long-run 
purchasing  power  parity  is then  implied  by the IS locus. The v parameter 
is the expected equilibrium  inflation  rate, which equals the expected 
growth  rate of the money supply  (from  the monetary  equilibrium  condi- 
tion). 
The diagram  below illustrates  for the sticky-price  monetary  model 
the response of nominal  and real exchange  rates and of prices to a one- 
time  increase  in the money supply  at time  tI and  to a permanent  increase 
in the growth  rate  of the money supply  at time t2. As in the first  diagram 
above, perfect  foresight  is assumed,  except for the disturbances,  which 
are unanticipated.  Following a monetary disturbance, the variables 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
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ultimately  converge to the same paths as in the flexible-price  monetary 
model.  11  But for some time the real exchange rate is deflected  from its 
equilibrium  value. For example, an unanticipated  monetary  expansion 
at time tl  leads to a transitory  rise in the real exchange rate (a real 
depreciation  of the home currency). The nominal  exchange rate may 
overshoot its long-run  level or path, as illustrated  in the diagram,  but 
this result  depends  on the parameter  values of the model. 
The sticky-price  monetary  model  was consistent  with several  stylized 
facts that did not fit with the flexible-price  model. Not only did it admit 
deviations  from  purchasing  power  parity,  but it provided  an explanation 
for periods when a rising nominal  interest rate was associated with a 
11. Monetary  disturbances  may include  unanticipated  changes  in monetary  policy or 
changes  in money  demand  that  are  expected  to persist  while monetary  policy is expected 
to pursue  an unchanged  monetary  target.  Changes  in the IS locus, including  modifications 
in fiscal  policy, can give rise to the same  kind  of exchange  rate  effects if they do not alter 
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strong currency. In the flexible-price  monetary model, a rise in the 
interest  rate  was always  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  rate  of inflation 
and  more  rapid  depreciation  (or  less rapid  appreciation)  of the currency. 
In the sticky-price monetary  model a persistently  higher level of the 
interest rate would reflect higher inflation and be associated with a 
weaker currency. But an increase in the interest rate and declining 
inflationary  expectations  may  be produced  by a shift  to tighter  monetary 
policy, and  then the currency  will strengthen. 
The model suggests  that  changes  in the exchange  rate  may not have a 
simple relation to monetary  aggregates  even when money supply dis- 
turbances  are the underlying  cause. Expectations  concerning  the future 
behavior of money supplies may be much more important  than their 
current  behavior  in  determining  the  exchange  rate.  Thus  poor  correlation 
between contemporaneous  changes in monetary aggregates and ex- 
change  rates can be explained.  (This  is also true  of the rational  expecta- 
tions version  of the flexible-price  monetary  model.)  The  overshooting  of 
the exchange rate associated with sticky prices also seems to account 
for a widespread perception that rates tend to move too far in one 
direction  and  then reverse themselves. 
With  sticky  prices,  the  assumption  that  assets denominated  in  different 
currencies  must  provide  the same  expected rate  of return  to a particular 
investor (uncovered interest parity) does not mean that real interest 
rates must be the same for residents of different  countries, as it does 
with flexible prices. Indeed, differences in real interest rates across 
residents of different  countries  must match  expectations  of real appre- 
ciation or depreciation  of currencies. This point is discussed further 
below. 
Looking back over the first three years of floating, it appears that 
sustained  exchange rate swings occurred  over periods  of three months 
to a year. Thus the convergence to equilibrium  was assumed to be 
relatively rapid. In empirical  work real interest rate differentials  were 
sought in short-term  rates, while changes in long-term  interest rates 
were viewed as indicative  of changing  inflation  expectations. Frankel 
achieved some success in interpreting  the model  this way for explaining 
the behavior of the mark-dollar  rate.12 Although  allowances had to be 
12. Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "On the Mark:  A Theory  of Floating  Exchange  Rates Based 
on Real Interest  Differentials,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 69 (September  1979), 
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made for the initial adjustment  to floating  rates and the oil shock, the 
sticky-price  monetary  model showed promise. 
EXCHANGE  MARKET  DEVELOPMENTS: 
LATE  1975  TO  EARLY  1979 
Developments in 1976 did not seriously challenge the sticky-price 
monetary  model. It was the most tranquil  year  for the weighted-average 
exchange  rate of the dollar  of the entire ten years of floating.  But there 
were major  adjustments  among  foreign  currencies.  Authorities  in Italy 
and France were forced to abandon intra-European  narrow-margin 
commitments,  and  their  currencies  depreciated  sharply.  The downward 
pressure then shifted to the pound. Some saw the weakness of this 
currency  as reflecting  a structural  shift away from the pound  by OPEC 
and  other  investors.  The  pound  stabilized  only after  a standby  agreement 
calling  for more restrictive  policies was concluded  between the United 
Kingdom  and  the International  Monetary  Fund  at the end of the year. 
The weakness of the lira, franc, and  pound  and subsequent  accelera- 
tion of inflation  in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom  revived and 
sharpened  the debate about whether floating exchange rates tend to 
destabilize  inflation.  There  was considerable  discussion  of "vicious and 
virtuous cycles" in which high inflation  and currency  depreciation  or 
low inflation  and  currency  appreciation  reinforce  one another.  13  At least 
some who saw such  a process at work  seemed  to have  in mind  a perpetual 
cycle that was touched off by an exogenous disturbance  to exchange 
rates. At the other pole were those who believed the source of such 
apparent  cycles was the different  monetary  policy choices of national 
13. For more detail on various  aspects of the vicious circle hypothesis, see Rudiger 
Dombusch and Paul Krugman,  "Flexible Exchange  Rates in the Short Run," BPEA, 
3:1976,  pp. 537-75;  Giorgio  Basevi and Paul  De Grauwe,  "Vicious  and  Virtuous  Circles: 
A Theoretical  Analysis  and a Policy Proposal  for Managing  Exchange  Rates," European 
Economic  Review, vol. 10 (December  1977),  pp. 277-301;  Maurice  Obstfeld, "Relative 
Prices, Employment,  and  the Exchange  Rate  in an Economy  with Foresight,"  Econome- 
trica,  vol. 50 (September  1982),  pp. 1219-42;  and  John  F. 0. Bilson, "The 'Vicious  Circle' 
Hypothesis,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 26 (March  1979),  pp. 1-37. For a sorting  out of the 
theoretical  issues, see Henry  Wallich  and  Jo Anna  Gray,  "Stabilization  Policy  and  Vicious 
and Virtuous  Circles," in John S. Chipman  and Charles  P. Kindleberger,  eds., Flexible 
Exchange  Rates  and  the Balance  of  Payments:  Essays  in Memory  of  Egon  Sohmen 
(Amsterdam:  North  Holland,  1980),  pp. 49-65. Jeffrey  R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  23 
authorities.  They used the sticky-price  monetary  model  to demonstrate 
that an actual  or expected shift toward  a more expansionary  monetary 
policy would be reflected more rapidly  in currency weakness than in 
higher  inflation.  Thus  to infer  causality  from  the observation  that  changes 
in  exchange  rates  sometimes  preceded  changes  in  inflation  was to commit 
the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter  hoc. In the middle  were some who 
believed that disturbances  could originate  in foreign  exchange markets 
as well as in domestic monetary policy, but that these disturbances 
would  be self-limiting  unless accommodated  by monetary  policy. 
After 1976, evidence less favorable to the sticky-price monetary 
model  began  to emerge. One  anomaly  was that  the model  did  not provide 
a role for shifts in investors' preferences among currencies. Market 
commentary  increasingly associated exchange rate movements with 
such portfolio  shifts; and evidence began to accumulate  as early as late 
1976  that the uncovered  interest  parity  condition  might  not hold or that 
the expectations for which it held were not rational.  Put another  way, 
there appeared to be  systematic differences in the rates of return 
achievable from holding open positions in different currencies if no 
allowance  was made  for risk. 
Early research supporting  this result was not conclusive and used 
daily data, hence allowing  for the possibility  that the anomaly  might  be 
a very short-run  phenomenon.  14 The apparent  profit  opportunities  could 
also be dismissed  as a temporary  phenomenon  that  would  dissipate  once 
market  participants  learned  to operate  in the new regime.  Moreover,  the 
results had to be viewed as tentative until out-of-sample  tests could 
be conducted. But evidence has continued to accumulate  that casts 
strong doubt on the joint hypotheses embedded  in tests of uncovered 
interest rate parity-that  is, the hypotheses that otherwise identical 
nonmoney assets denominated  in different currencies are viewed as 
perfect substitutes  (and hence bear the same expected rates of return) 
and  that  expectations  are rational.  15  Earlier  tests have been redone  with 
14. See Michael  P. Dooley and Jeffrey  R. Shafer,  "Analysis  of Short-Run  Exchange 
Rate  Behavior:  March  1973  to September  1975,"  International  Finance  Discussion  Paper 
123  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1976). 
15. Tests of this joint hypotheses are alternatively  referred  to as tests of foreign- 
exchange  market  efficiency  or as tests for time-varying  risk  premiums,  depending  mainly 
on which part  of the joint hypothesis  the researcher  is most prepared  to interpret  as the 
source of the rejection.  Little progress  has been made toward  empirically  resolving  the 
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new data confirming  the existence of systematic  profit  opportunities.  16 
Moreover, with a lengthening  period of floating  rates to examine and 
new econometric techniques, tests  on weekly,  monthly, and even 
quarterly  changes in exchange rates have become more powerful, and 
these tests tend to give qualitatively  similar  results.  17 
Beginning  in June 1977, the dollar  began a steep slide against  most 
currencies  that continued  until November 1, 1978,  when a major  effort 
was undertaken  to stabilize its foreign exchange value. The weighted- 
average  dollar  dropped  more  than 15  percent  during  this period-and  13 
percent  in real terms. The depreciation  against  the yen was about  twice 
as large. In these years the U.S.  inflation rate rose relative to that 
abroad,  but U.S. short-term  nominal  interest  rates rose relative  to rates 
abroad  by about  as much. Although  inflationary  expectations  may have 
contributed  to the nominal  depreciation  of the dollar, the combination 
of price and interest  rate developments  in this period  did not appear  to 
explain  such large  changes  in the real  exchange  rate. 
Fellner  provides  a case for understanding  the slide  of the dollar  during 
this period  in terms of the sticky-price  monetary  model. He argues  that 
differentials  in real  interest  rates among  countries  might  be expected by 
market  participants  to be much more  persistent  than assumed  earlier.  18 
Frankel in his work on the mark-dollar  rate and others assume that 
changes  in long-term  nominal  interest  rates are a measure  of changes  in 
inflation  expectations.19  According to this line of thought, only short- 
term interest rates are viewed as moving somewhat independently  of 
inflation. By extending the hypothetical duration of disequilibrium, 
16. See Michael  P. Dooley and  Jeffrey  R. Shafer,  "Analysis  of Short-Run  Exchange 
Rate Behavior:  March  1973  to November 1981  ," in David  Bigman  and  Teizo Taya, eds., 
Exchange  Rate  and Trade Instability:  Causes,  Consequences  and Remedies  (Ballinger, 
1983),  pp. 43-69. 
17. Recent econometric  studies include Lars Peter Hansen and Robert  J. Hodrick, 
"Forward  Exchange  Rates  As Optimal  Predictors  of Future  Spot  Rates:  An Econometric 
Analysis,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  88 (October  1980), pp. 829-53; Robert E. 
Cumby  and Maurice  Obstfeld, "A Note on Exchange-Rate  Expectations  and Nominal 
Interest  Differentials:  A Test of the Fisher  Hypothesis,"  Journal  of Finance, vol. 36  (June 
1981),  pp. 697-703;  and John  F. 0.  Bilson, "The 'Speculative  Efficiency'  Hypothesis," 
Jolurnal  of Business,  vol. 54 (July 1981), pp. 435-51. 
18. See William  Fellner, "The Bearing  of Risk Aversion  on Movements  of Spot and 
Forward  Exchange  Relative  to the Dollar," in John  S. Chipman  and Charles  P. Kindle- 
berger, eds.,  Flexible Exchange  Rates  and the Balance  of Payments:  Essays  in Memoty 
of Egon Sohmen  (Amsterdam:  North  Holland,  1980),  pp. 113-26. 
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Fellner associates much larger  changes in the real exchange rate with 
the effects of divergent  monetary  policies on real  interest  differentials.20 
But having  dropped  the long-term  interest  rate  as a measure  of long-run 
inflationary  expectations,  Fellner's  argument  rests on the plausibility  of 
particular  values for inflationary  expectations rather  than hypothesis 
tests. We return  to the Fellner  hypothesis  below. 
Many observers began to view the 1977-78 slide of the dollar as 
primarily  an adjustment  to the large and growing deficit in the U.S. 
current  account  and surpluses  in Germany  and Japan.  This constituted 
a second phenomenon  that was not directly explainable  in the context 
of the sticky-price  monetary  model. Figure  3 shows the real weighted- 
average  exchange rates for these three countries  and the United King- 
dom, together  with their  cumulative  current  account  positions  from  the 
first quarter  of 1973  to the end of 1982. (The change in the cumulative 
measure is the current account for each period.) Note that current 
account  imbalances  have been larger  and more volatile from  the outset 
of the floating  rate  period  than  they had  been during  the Bretton  Woods 
period. The extenuating  factors discussed above-greater  trade inter- 
dependence,  inherited  disequilibrium,  and  the two oil shocks-allowed 
the advocates of floating  rates to remain  unconcerned.  But those who 
had made strong claims for the self-equilibrating  properties  of floating 
exchange  rates had  certainly  overstated  the case. 
The events of 1977-78  had  their  origins  several  years before. In early 
1975 the U.S.  current account surged into surplus as the sharp U.S. 
recession  reduced  imports.  But with recovery  in the economy and  in the 
dollar,  the current  account began to decline rapidly.  At the same time, 
Germany  and  Japan  were in substantial  current  account  surplus.  Yet the 
markets  reacted  only after Secretary  of the Treasury  Blumenthal  made 
a statement in June 1977 calling attention to the imbalances. (The 
statement  was widely interpreted  as a desire on the part of the Carter 
administration  to see the dollar  decline.) 
One source of the current  account imbalances  and exchange market 
pressures  was the relatively  more  growth-oriented  policies  of the United 
20. To illustrate  this point, assume  full adjustment  takes five years and a real rate  of 
return  differential  of 2 percent  is expected to prevail,  on average,  in the interim.  Then  a 
displacement  of the exchange  rate  from  purchasing  power  parity  of more  than 10  percent 
would  be warranted.  Thus  the model  could be consistent  with  rather  large  changes  in the 
exchange  rate  in response  to moderate  changes  in long-term  nominal  interest  rates  relative 
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Figure 3.  Real Effective Exchange  Rates and Cumulative  Current 
Account  Positionsa 
Cumulative 
Real effective  exchange  rate, mark  current  account 
(index,  1973:1  =  100)  (billions  of marks) 
100 
Germany  ,  " Current  account 
150  /  "  80 
10  o  Real effective  exchange  rate  40 
_  ,'  ]  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~20 
65  ,"oll  l  l 
1975  1980 
Cumulative 
Real effective  exchange  rate,  yen  current  account 
(index,  1973:1  = 100)  (trillions  of yen) 
8 
150  6 
Real effective  exchange  rate  / 
*' Current  account 
pg  ~~~~~~~~~~0 
65  I  V  1  I  I  I  I  -2 
1975  1980 
Source:  Quarterly data. Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York,  international macro data base. 
a.  Effective  rates are weighted averages of each currency against six others (expressed  in units of foreign currency 
per unit of domestic  currency).  The seven  currencies  are the U.S.  dollar, mark, yen,  pound sterling, lira, Canadian Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  27 
Figure 3 (continued) 
Cumulative 
Real effective  exchange  rate,  pound  current  account 
(index,  1973:1  = 100)  (billions  of pounds) 
15 
United  Kingdom 
150  -10 
5 
Real effective  exchange  rate  0 
1000  ,  0_ 
Current  account 
65  10 
1975  1980 
Cumulative 
Real effective  exchange  rate, U.S. dollar  current  account 
(index,  1973:1  = 100)  (billions  of U.S. dollars) 
40 
United  States 
150  _  30 
,  \ Current  account 
20 
100  10 
0 
65  L  l  t  -o 
1975  1980 
dollar,  and  French  franc.  Weights  are  normalized  according  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund's  multilateral 
exchange  rate  model  for  the  seven  currencies.  The  cumulative  current  account  is  the  algebraic  sum  of  current 
surpluses and deficits from 1973:1. 28  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
States and the more anti-inflation  emphasis  of policies in Germany  and 
Japan. Another source was U.S.  energy policy, which discouraged 
domestic  oil production  by keeping  oil prices  below world  market  levels, 
thereby  increasing  already  expanding  oil imports.  At the Bonn Summit 
in July 1978 these considerations  lay behind a package that included 
commitments  to fiscal stimulus  by Germany  and  Japan,  where inflation 
had  dropped  to low levels, and commitments  to energy price decontrol 
and stronger  anti-inflation  policies by the United  States. The slide of the 
dollar  continued,  however, and  even steepened.21 
OnNovember  1, 1978,  U.S. authorities  announced  theirdetermination 
to correct what they termed an excessive depreciation  of the dollar.22 
The dollar  was driven  up sharply,  but it was not until early 1979  that it 
showed some strength  on its own, and intervention  could begin to be 
unwound.  By then, signs of current  account  convergence  were appear- 
ing. 
Market  commentary  in 1977-78  also focused on international  diver- 
sification  of asset portfolios  as an additional  source of dollar  weakness. 
Exchange rate risk as well as expected return  received more attention 
as potential forces in exchange markets.23  Evidence on how much 
currency  diversification  occurred  is skimpy. But even the data that are 
available  are hard  to interpret  because changing  shares  of currencies  in 
portfolios  were dominated  by changing  currency  values rather  than by 
changes  in the relative  quantities  of dollars  and  other  currencies.24 
21. A number of efforts were made to moderate the slide. Initially intervention 
operations  were  undertaken  mainly  by German  and  Japanese  authorities;  but  as time  went 
on, there  was increased  intervention  by U.S. authorities  using  foreign  currencies  obtained 
from  swap  drawings  with  foreign  central  banks. 
22. The measures announced  included stepped up intervention  backed by greatly 
expanded  resources  and  a tightening  of monetary  policy  underscored  by a hike  of 200  basis 
points  in the Federal  Reserve  discount  rate. 
23. It was thought  that Middle  Eastern  countries  and some others  were increasingly 
spreading  their  foreign  currency  reserves  over a number  of currencies  rather  than  holding 
only or mostly dollar  assets in order  to reduce  exposure  to exchange  rate fluctuations. 
Private  investors  were thought  to be responding  to the same  incentives. 
24. These valuation  effects could  be interpreted  as the results  of attempts  to diversify 
leading  to exchange  rate  changes  that  brought  actual  portfolio  shares  into  line  with  desired 
shares  without  large  net changes  in currency  holdings.  Indeed,  in a pure  floating  exchange 
rate regime  (with no intervention)  this is the only way diversification  could occur in the 
aggregate  because net supplies of assets denominated  in various currencies  would be 
determined  solely by fiscal deficits. The evidence is also difficult  to evaluate because 
changes in exchange  rates from other causes would lead to the same valuation-induced 
changes  in portfolio  shares  if investors  were passive. Moreover,  even if holders  of dollars Jeffrey R.  Shafer  and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  29 
THE  PORTFOLIO-BALANCE  MODEL 
The development  of various  theoretical  formulations  of the portfolio- 
balance model was stimulated  by evidence that the uncovered interest 
arbitrage  condition  might  not hold, the casual  observation  that  exchange 
rates seemed to be influenced  by cumulative changes in the current 
account, and the expressed interest of official and private portfolio 
managers  in exchange risk as well as the expected rate of return on 
currencies.  The portfolio-balance  model has been around  for some time 
and has antecedents in both the theory of fixed exchange rates and 
domestic financial  theory.25  Its distinguishing  feature  is the assumption 
that interest-bearing  assets denominated  in different  currencies  are not 
perfect  substitutes  in  portfolios,  presumably  because  portfolio  managers 
are risk averse and because exchange risk cannot be completely elimi- 
nated  by diversification. 
In a simple  static  portfolio-balance  model, money  market  equilibrium 
is expressed as 
MX =  m(r,)P,VY. 
were able to shift into other currencies  or alter the relative  distribution  of additions  to 
reserves  because  authorities  in the key financial  centers  were  intervening,  the shifts  could 
be interpreted  as a response  to expectations  of dollar  depreciations-behavior  consistent 
with  the monetary  models. 
25. The portfolio-balance  approach  has been pursued  by a number  of authors. See 
Lance  Girton  and  Dale  W. Henderson,  "Central  Bank  Operations  in  Foreign  and  Domestic 
Assets under  Fixed  and  Flexible  Exchange  Rates," in Peter  B. Clark  and  others,  eds., The 
Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustments (U.S.  Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 151- 
79; Pentti J. K. Kouri, "Monetary  Policy, the Balance of Payments  and the Exchange 
Rate,"  in David  Bigman and Teizo  Taya,  eds.,  The Functioning  of Floating  Exchange 
Rates:  Theory, Evidence  and Policy Implications  (Ballinger,  1980), pp. 79-111;  William 
H. Branson, "Asset Markets  and Relative Prices in Exchange Rate Determination," 
Sozialwissenschaftliche  Annalen  des Instituts far Hohere  Studien, vol.  1 (1977), pp. 69- 
89;  and  Jeffrey  R. Shafer,  "The  Macroeconomic  Behavior  of a Large  Open  Economy  with 
a Floating  Exchange  Rate" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Yale University, 1976).  Antecedents  in 
the fixed  exchange  rate  literature  include  William  H. Branson,  "Monetary  Policy and  the 
New View of International  Capital  Movements," BPEA, 2:1970, pp. 235-62; Lance 
Girton  and  Dale  W. Henderson,  "Financial  Capital  Movements  and  Central  Bank  Behavior 
in a Two-Country,  Short-Run  Portfolio  Balance  Model,  " Journal  of Monetary  Economics, 
vol.  2 (January 1976), pp. 33-61; and Pentti J.  K.  Kouri and Michael G.  Porter, 
"International  Capital  Flows and Portfolio  Equilibrium,"  Journal  of Political  Economy, 
vol. 82 (May-June  1974),  pp. 443-67. The  framework  was developed  in a domestic  context 
in William  C. Brainard  and  James  Tobin,  "Pitfalls  in Financial  Model  Building,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 58 (May 1968, Papers and Proceedings,  1967), pp. 99-122. 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
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and  the IS locus, including  net  foreign  investment  income  as an  argument, 
as 
Y=  f (StP,*/P, rt 
-  pe,  Sr*B,*/Pt, W,/Pt), 
where W denotes wealth, and W -M  + B +  SB*. 
In this model, foreigners do not demand assets denominated in 
domestic currency, and money demand  depends only on the domestic 
interest rate and nominal  income. The rest of the world is large so that 
its interest rates, prices, and incomes are taken as exogenously given. 
One asset market  equation is redundant  by Walras's law. Thus, with 
home prices and exchange rate expectations given at a point in time, 
three equations determine  real output, the home interest rate, and the 
spot exchange rate.26  What distinguishes the model from monetary 
models  is that  the expected rate  of change  of the exchange  rate,  Se,  is not 
constrained  to correspond  exactly to the interest differential,  that is, 
uncovered  interest  parity  will not hold in general.  The expression (r - 
r* -  Se) is the deviation  from  uncovered  interest  parity.  If  this  expression 
is positive, the home currency  is said  to carry  a risk  premium. 
A dynamic  version of the portfolio-balance  model  provides  a mecha- 
nism for cumulative  imbalances  in the current  account to influence  the 
real exchange rate. Over time, wealth is transferred  from countries in 
deficit to countries in surplus. Assuming  that residents have a relative 
preference  for assets denominated  in their own currency, this redistri- 
bution  of wealth alters the relative  demands  for assets. The currency  of 
a country in deficit falls to a point from which it can subsequently  be 
expected to appreciate,  thus establishing  the risk  premium.  Beyond this 
common feature, this model and variants  of it can exhibit a range of 
26. More  general  formulations  of asset demands  and  endogenous  adjustment  of foreign 
variables  can be found  in the references  cited above. But at least some of the simplifying 
assumptions  or alternative  ones are normally  employed  to keep the model  tractable.  The 
model  presented  in the text is intended  merely  to illustrate  the approach  as an extension 
of the sticky-price  monetary  model. Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  31 
dynamic  properties  depending  on the degree  of asset substitutability  and 
the specific properties  of the real side of the model-the  determinants 
and speed of adjustment  of goods prices, aggregate  demands, and the 
distribution  of demand  among goods produced in different  countries. 
Hence characteristic  adjustment  paths like those shown for the more 
restrictive  models are not given. 
One  formulation  of the dynamic  portfolio-balance  model  incorporates 
the equations  of the static  model  and  the following  equations  of motion: 
evolution  of net supply  of assets denominated  in home  currency  is given 
by 
(B, -  Bt - )  = Dt -  (Mt -  Mt - )  -  It,, 
evolution of net domestic private holdings of assets denominated  in 
foreign  currency  by 
St (B,*-B,*  l) = PtCt + It,, 
the expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve by 
Pt =  g(Y,  -  Y) +  v, 
and  the current  account  by 
,= h(Y, -  Y, 
StP*lPt, W,/Pt) 
+  Str*B*/Pt, 
where D  is the domestic government deficit, I  is the central bank 
intervention  (the sale of foreign currency  reserves), and C is the real 
current  account  balance.  In this  dynamic  form  of the model  the evolution 
of stocks of assets is governed  by the fiscal deficit, the current  account, 
and monetary  policy. A role for exchange market intervention, even 
when sterilized so as to have no effect on money supplies, is also 
introduced.27 
27. The usual formulations  of this model ignore  the role of government  deficits  as a 
determinant  of the supply  of domestic  outside  assets. Their  implications  for the exchange 
rate,  through  the influence  on the IS locus, has  long  been  recognized.  For  a small  net initial 
position  in  foreign  currency,  the  effects  of a current  account  deficit  on portfolio  equilibrium 
will be large  relative  to the effects of a budget  deficit  of the same size because  the latter 
alters  the supply  of assets as well as wealth  with  a partially  offsetting  effect. Ignoring  the 
effects of budget  deficits on asset stocks may then have some  justification  beyond  just 
keeping  the  model  tractable.  But  with  the  growing  attention  that  fiscal  deficits  are  attracting 
in market commentary  on interest rate and even exchange rate developments, their 
theoretical  implications  are worthy of more attention  than they have received. 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
EXCHANGE  RATE  DEVELOPMENTS: 
EARLY  1979  TO  MARCH  I983 
In the period  from 1979  to 1982  the positions  of the dollar  and pound 
as weak currencies and the positions of the mark and yen as strong 
currencies  were  reversed.  After  stabilizing  in  early 1979,  the dollar  began 
a climb  that, by any measure,  dwarfed  all its earlier  swings. By late 1982 
the real weighted-average  value of the dollar  was at a higher  level than 
at the beginning  of the float almost ten years earlier  or at any time in 
between. The mark  was near  its all-time  low on a real  weighted-average 
basis and  the yen, measured  the same  way, fell to the level that  prevailed 
in  the early  part  of the  float.  The  pound  appreciated  even more  drastically 
than  the dollar  in 1979-80  but had  fallen  back somewhat  in 1981.  In late 
1982  the pound  dropped  sharply  and  the dollar  declined  slightly  from  its 
highs  measured  against  the mark  and yen. 
The  factors  that  have appeared  in market  commentary  to explain  rates 
since 1979 have been the same as those identified  in earlier periods, 
including  those that had been incorporated  into the progressively  more 
general  asset market  models. One  might  say that, after  the first  six years 
of floating, we had seen it all. But the large swings in interest rates 
relative  to inflation  received by far  the most attention. 
In retrospect, 1979  appears  to have been a relatively  good year  for the 
dollar.  But the sense at the time  was one of apprehension.  Nonmonetary 
as well as monetary  factors received considerable  attention.  The dollar 
dropped against European currencies as the second round of large 
increases  in oil prices began  at mid-year.  In contrast  to 1974,  the United 
States was much more dependent on imported  oil, and there was no 
longer a presumption that OPEC reserve accumulations would be 
invested mainly in dollars. Developments in the oil market and the 
election  of the  Thatcher  government,  which  promised  stronger  monetary 
control in the United Kingdom,  were associated with a sharp  upswing 
of the pound. The mark generally moved upward against the dollar, 
along  with the European  currencies  included  in the European  Monetary 
System, which was launched in March 1979. The yen was the most 
markedly  weak  currency  in 1979;  a declining  trend  of the current  account 
became clear, and Japan,  once again,  was expected to be a major  loser 
as a result  of higher  oil prices. Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  33 
Since  late 1979,  monetary  developments-notably erratic  movements 
in U.S. interest rates-seem  to have been by far the most important 
influence  on exchange rates. In September  the weakness of the dollar 
against  the mark  reappeared  as earlier  expectations  of a recession in the 
United States gave way to heightened concern about inflation. On 
October  6, 1979,  the Federal  Reserve adopted  its new reserve targeting 
procedures  designed  to gain  closer  control  over  M  1.  The  dollar  recovered 
against  the mark  as interest  rates rose initially,  then sagged  as expecta- 
tions of further  increases in the U.S. interest  rate  were not fulfilled. 
In 1980  U.S. interest  rates and  exchange  rates  moved in tandem,  first 
rising through  April, then falling until late summer, then rising again 
through  the end of the year. In 1981  the dollar  continued  to climb  to still 
higher levels even though interest rates did not surpass their earlier 
peaks  and  interest  rates in Germany  and  many  other  countries  also rose. 
But by then a surplus in the U.S.  current  account had emerged that 
contrasted  with deficits  in Germany  and  Japan.  Declining  U.S. inflation 
was also seen as a positive factor for the dollar. While the shorter-run 
movements  of the dollar  continued  to be related  to changes  in the interest 
rate  in 1982,  the strength  of the trend  could  no longer  be explained  solely 
by movements of short-term  rates. And the real value of the dollar, 
relative  to earlier  periods, appeared  to point toward  substantial  deficits 
in the current  account down the road. A drop  in U.S. interest  rates and 
the emergence  of a current  account  deficit  brought  only a small  reversal 
of the cumulative  rise in the dollar.  Some observers  argue  that portfolio 
preferences  shifted toward  the dollar  as a safe haven, given the earlier 
election of a Socialist government  in France, turmoil in Poland, and 
political  uncertainty  in Germany. 
Meanwhile  the strength  of the pound  in 1979  and 1980  has  been largely 
reversed since the end of 1981.  It is easy to point to qualitative  factors 
that  would account  for this-moderately lower interest  rates and  weak- 
ening of the world oil market.  But inflation  in the United Kingdom  has 
finally slowed decisively; growth of the money supply was slower in 
1982  than  earlier,  and the current  account  has remained  in surplus. 
Although  the qualitative  behavior  of exchange  markets  in  recent  years 
seems consistent  with the earlier  years of floating,  many  would  question 
whether  relations  that are stable over the entire  period  of floating  rates 
can  be identified  and  whether  these  relations  are  quantitatively  consistent 
with the theory as it now stands. Without  such relations, one cannot 34  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
offer general, as opposed to ad hoc, explanations  of the behavior of 
exchange  rates. In the next section we look for such systematic  relations 
and explore some specific questions concerning  the quantitative  con- 
sistency of exchange rate behavior  using the predictions  of the various 
models  of the asset market. 
Empirical Evaluation of Exchange Rate Models 
During  the past decade the development  of the theory of exchange 
rate determination  has been heavily influenced  by the events of the 
floating  rate period. Models have been continually  modified  to incorpo- 
rate important  new stylized facts. Yet empirical  confirmation  of the 
evolving  theories  has proven  more  elusive. Whenjudged  by the criterion 
of out-of-sample  fit, the structural  models surveyed above fail at all 
forecasting  horizons  to outperform  a simple  random-walk  model.28 
When  judged  from  the standpoint  of a weaker  criterion-consistency 
with historical  experience-various  models have proven successful in 
terms  of tests of significance  and  predicting  directions  of effects, although 
often  for only a particular  currency  and  subsample  period.29  This section 
28. Richard  A. Meese and Kenneth  S. Rogoff  compared  the out-of-sample  fit (using 
actual values of the exogenous variables)  of several popular  structural  and time-series 
models of exchange  rate  determination  for the dollar-mark,  dollar-pound,  and dollar-yen 
exchange  rates. They conclude  that  a random-walk  model,  which  takes  today's exchange 
rate  as the best predictor  for all future  rates, performs  as well as the structural  and time- 
series models  over the sample  period  from  December  1976  to June 1981.  See Meese and 
Rogoff,  "Empirical  Exchange  Rate  Models  of the  Seventies:  Do  They  Fit  Out-of-Sample?" 
Journal of International Economics,  vol.  14 (February 1983), pp. 3-24. 
29. Early evidence in support  of the flexible-price  monetary  models include  Bilson, 
"The Monetary  Approach,"  and  Hodrick,  "An Empirical  Analysis." Frankel  in "On  the 
Mark" presented evidence favorable  to the sticky-price  model. Later, less favorable 
results were provided  by Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Exchange  Rate Economics:  Where  Do 
We Stand?"  BPEA, 1:1  980, pp. 143-85;  and  Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "On  the Mark:  Reply," 
American  Economic  Review, vol. 71 (December  1981),  pp. 1075-82. For the portfolio- 
balance approach,  William  Branson, Hannu  Halttunen,  and Paul Masson, "Exchange 
Rates in the Short-Run:  The Dollar-Deutschemark  Rate," European  Economic  Review, 
vol. 10 (December  1977),  pp. 303-24, provide  mildly  supportive  evidence that was later 
qualified  in their "Exchange  Rates in the Short-Run:  Some Further  Results," European 
Economic  Review, vol. 12 (October  1979),  pp. 395-402. Obstfeld  estimates  a structural 
portfolio-balance  model of the dollar-mark  rate and finds  little empirical  support  for the 
model's  key policy  implication-the ability  of sterilized  intervention  to affect  the  exchange 
rate. See Maurice  Obstfeld, "Exchange  Rates, Inflation,  and the Sterilization  Problem: 
Germany,  1975-1981,"  European  Economic  Review,  vol.  21 (March-April  1983), pp. 
161-89. Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  35 
focuses on the short-run  volatility of exchange rates and evaluates 
models  of exchange  rate  determination  on the basis of the less stringent 
criterion  of in-sample  ability  to track  the facts. 
One of the hallmarks  of the period  following the Bretton  Woods era 
has  been the high  volatility  of both  real  and  nominal  exchange  rates. The 
evidence in figure  1 reveals that, even using quarterly  average  data  that 
smooth  over much  of the short-run  volatility,  there  have been wide and 
sustained swings in exchange rates over the 1970s. Table 2 reports 
estimates of  standard deviations of  daily, weekly, four-week, and 
twelve-week percentage  changes in nominal  exchange rates over four 
subperiods  of the past decade. Volatility  of the dollar-mark  and dollar- 
yen rates was generally relatively high in the early years of flexible 
exchange  rates, a consequence of the inevitable  learning  period  and  the 
severe oil and  other  commodity  price  shocks that  accompanied  it. There 
followed a period of relative calm in foreign  exchange markets  lasting 
several  years, but the past five years have been characterized  by a rising 
trend in exchange rate volatility. For the dollar-pound  exchange rate, 
the second subperiod  was punctuated  by a weakening  of the pound in 
1976,  which culminated  in an International  Monetary  Fund  stabilization 
program  for  the United  Kingdom  in  January  1977.  Volatility  rose steadily 
for the dollar-pound  rate  during  the 1970s  with  no respite  in these middle 
years. 
The observation  that  nominal  exchange  rates  have been volatile, and, 
in some cases,  increasingly volatile, does not in itself constitute a 
condemnation  of the floating  rate regime. In an efficiently  functioning 
foreign exchange market, the exchange rate will respond immediately 
and fully to new information  received by market  participants.  In this 
respect, a high  degree of exchange  rate  volatility  is implied  by the asset 
price characterization  of the exchange rate that serves as the common 
denominator  of all the major  theories. In this view, a high degree of 
exchange  rate volatility  would be predicted  if expectations  of the future 
course of variables influencing  the exchange rate were uncertain  and 
subject to large revisions. Indeed, if all exchange rate changes were 
related  solely to the advent  of new and  unanticipated  information  on the 
market, the exchange rate would follow a random  walk-today's  ex- 
change  rate would be the best predictor  of all expected future  exchange 
rates. If exchange rate changes were caused by new information  about 
the future  path of economic variables,  superior  to that contained  in the 36  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 2.  Volatility  of Exchange  Rates, Selected Periods, April 1973 
to February 1983a 
Percent 
Standard  deviation  of change in exchange rate 
Dollar-mark  Dollar-yen  Dollar-pound 
Nor-  Nor-  Nor- 
Period  Actual  malized  Actual  malized  Actual  malized 
April 1973-September  1974 
(transition  to floating 
rates and first oil shock) 
Daily  0.86  0.86  0.52  0.52  0.42  0.42 
Weekly  1.65  0.74  1.12  0.50  0.98  0.44 
Four-week  intervals  4.52  1.01  2.73  0.61  2.19  0.49 
Twelve-week  intervals  6.89  0.89  4.26  0.55  3.95  0.51 
October 1974-May  1977 
(relative  calm) 
Daily  0.43  0.43  0.23  0.23  0.49  0.49 
Weekly  0.89  0.40  0.56  0.25  1.05  0.47 
Four-week  intervals  2.24  0.50  1.30  0.29  2.15  0.48 
Twelve-week  intervals  3.49  0.45  2.56  0.33  4.49  0.58 
June 1977-October  5, 1979 
(weakness of the dollar) 
Daily  0.61  0.61  0.64  0.64  0.57  0.57 
Weekly  1.25  0.56  1.50  0.67  1.14  0.51 
Four-week  intervals  2.91  0.65  3.53  0.79  2.68  0.60 
Twelve-week  intervals  3.80  0.49  6.12  0.79  4.26  0.55 
October  6, 1979-February 
1983  (resurgence  of the 
dollar) 
Daily  0.76  0.76  0.81  0.81  0.72  0.72 
Weekly  1.52  0.68  1.68  0.75  1.41  0.63 
Four-week  intervals  3.18  0.71  3.67  0.82  2.95  0.66 
Twelve-week  intervals  4.65  0.68  5.89  0.76  5.73  0.74 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  New  York noon  bid rates,  Board of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve 
System,  international macro data base. 
a.  Standard deviations  of  changes  in the  logarithms of  three  bilateral exchange  rates,  calculated  for daily  and 
weekly  changes  and  changes  at intervals  of  four and twelve  weeks.  The  normalized  standard deviations  are the 
actuals divided  by the square root of the number of days in the change calculated-that  is,  by the square roots of 5 
for  the  weekly  changes,  20 for  changes  every  four  weeks,  and 60 for  changes  every  twelve  weeks.  Use  of  this 
normalization  implies  that,  if the  exchange  rate exactly  followed  a random walk,  the  normalized  entries  for  each 
subperiod would be equal in large samples. 
current  values of those variables themselves, then the exchange rate 
would be a good predictor  of other variables  but would itself be poorly 
explained  even by current  values of other  variables. 
In fact, evidence has been found that  is consistent with the view that Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  37 
nominal exchange rates follow approximately  a random walk.30  The 
results  in table  2 provide  some further  evidence  of the near  random-walk 
pattern  of exchange  rate movements,  based on the pattern  of exchange 
rate  variability  across  varying  time  horizons.  If the  exchange  rate  follows 
a random  walk,  the  variance  of the  five-day,  or  one-trading-week,  change 
in the exchange rate will be five times that of the one-day change, and 
the standard  deviation  of the five-day  change  will be the square  root of 
five times that of the one-day change. Normalized  standard  deviations 
are  reported  in table  2; the standard  deviations  of one-week, four-week, 
and  twelve-week  changes  in that  table  are divided  by the square  roots of 
five, twenty, and sixty,  respectively. For each subperiod the four 
normalized  standard  deviations  would  all be equal  in large  samples  if the 
exchange rate exactly followed a random  walk. The normalized  mea- 
sures,  while  not identical,  are  generally  close in value, so that  the pattern 
of volatility  across the four  time  aggregations  for each subsample  period 
suggests random-walk  behavior. There is no clear tendency for fre- 
quently  occurring  changes  in exchange  rates  to either  reinforce  or offset 
one another over longer time intervals (positive or negative serial 
correlation). 
SHORT-RUN  EXCHANGE  RATE  VOLATILITY 
An assessment of whether exchange rates have been too volatile 
during  the 1970s  should  include  three considerations.  First, attainment 
of  greater exchange rate stability could entail sacrificing domestic 
monetary  policy objectives. For example, the decision by the United 
30. Interest  in exploring  whether  exchange rates follow a random  walk dates back 
more than fifteen years to work by Poole. See William  Poole, "Speculative  Prices as 
Random  Walks:  An Analysis  of Ten Time  Series  of Flexible  Exchange  Rates," Southern 
Economic  Journal,  vol. 33  (April  1967),  pp.  468-78. For  a more  recent  analysis  see Michael 
Mussa, "Empirical  Regularities  in the Behavior  of Exchange  Rates and Theories  of the 
Foreign  Exchange Market,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Policies for 
Employment,  Prices,  and Exchange  Rates,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series  on 
Public  Policy, vol. 11 (Amsterdam:  North Holland, 1979),  pp. 9-57. Mussa claims that 
recent exchange rate behavior  has conformed  closely to the random-walk  hypothesis. 
Econometric  evidence  consistent  with  (but  not  directly  proving)  the random-walk  hypoth- 
esis is provided  by Richard  A. Meese and Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "On Unit Roots and  the 
Empirical  Modeling  of Exchange  Rates," Journal  of Finance, vol. 37 (September  1982), 
pp. 1029-35.  In the forecasting  context, Meese and  Rogoff  in their "Empirical  Exchange 
Rate  Models"  show that  a random-walk  model  of exchange  rates  generally  yields  a better 
out-of-sample  fit  than  the forward  rate  or any of the structural  models. 38  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
States authorities in October 1979 to abandon operating procedures 
focusing on the federal funds rate in favor of reserve targeting  led to 
higher interest rate volatility. Asset market models indicate that ex- 
change  rate  changes  will  be closely related  to interest  rate  developments. 
Thus the change in domestic operating  procedures  of monetary  policy 
may have heightened  exchange  rate volatility  in the recent period. 
A second consideration  is whether  nominal  exchange rate volatility 
has a detrimental  effect on the real  macroeconomy.  It is evident  in figure 
1 that  nominal  exchange  rate  volatility  has been closely associated  with, 
and  perhaps  often the source  of, real  exchange  rate  volatility.  These real 
exchange  rate changes  may serve as a conduit  for transmitting  the effect 
of nominal  exchange rate volatility  to the real economy. For the dollar- 
mark  and dollar-yen  rates during  the past decade the contemporaneous 
correlation  between  the nominal  and  real  exchange  rates  has  been high- 
0.61 and  0.84, respectively. For the dollar-pound  rate, the correlation  is 
lower, 0.30, at least partly because rapid  price inflation  in the United 
Kingdom  during  much of the past decade has often roughly  kept pace 
with changes  in exchange  rates over time. The high  correlation  between 
nominal and real exchange rates in the cases of the dollar-mark  and 
dollar-yen  rates is consistent with the notion that prices are sticky so 
that  purchasing  power parity  will not hold in the short  run.31 
At the microeconomic level it has been argued that nominal and 
associated real exchange rate volatility may deter international  trade 
and investment by greatly complicating  the profit-maximizing  calcula- 
tions of firms. The uncertainty  created by real exchange rate volatility 
could  lead  to misallocation  of resources.  Little  statistical  evidence exists 
to date, however, that exchange rate volatility  has had negative  effects 
of this sort.32 
31. Sluggish price adjustment  is not, however, a necessary condition  for a strong 
correlation  between nominal and real exchange rate movements. For example, the 
exchange  rate  may  respond  to real  shocks  that  require  a change  in the equilibrium  relative 
price of national  outputs. For an example  of this type of model, see Alan C. Stockman, 
"A Theory of Exchange Rate Determination,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88 
(August  1980),  pp. 673-98. 
32. See, for example,  Peter  Hooper  and S. W. Kohlhagen,  "The Effects  of Exchange 
Rate Uncertainty  on the Prices  and Volume  of International  Trade,"  Journal  of Interna- 
tional Economics, vol. 8 (November 1978),  pp. 483-511. They find little evidence of a 
significant  effect of unanticipated  variability  in the nominal  exchange  rate (measured  as 
the absolute difference  between the lagged  forward  and current  spot rates) on export 
volumes,  but  identify  some  influence  on export  prices  for  the period  from  1965:1  to 1975:4. 
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The final and probably  most important  consideration  in assessing if 
nominal  rates have been overly volatile  is whether  exchange  rates move 
principally  in response to new and unanticipated  developments  in so- 
called  fundamentals- variables  suggested  by theory  as important  deter- 
minants  of the exchange  rate-  and  whether  they react  to an appropriate 
degree. In other words, does this volatility appear to serve a clear 
economic purpose? This issue is not readily resolved because any 
assessment of whether exchange rates are too volatile is necessarily 
rooted in an underlying  model of exchange rate determination  and its 
prediction  of what  a warranted  response to changes  in the determinants 
would be. Therefore,  each model of exchange rate determination  may 
imply  a different  measure  of excess volatility.  Moreover,  some  important 
economic variables  are  empirically  unmeasurable,  or at best measurable 
with substantial error given existing statistical techniques and data 
sources. How can one accurately quantify the effect of a Thatcher, 
Reagan,  or Mitterrand  election  on expected  future  monetary  growth  and 
inflation?  Or  the impact  of the Iranian  revolution,  the rise and  decline of 
OPEC  wealth, or the international  debt crisis on portfolio  preferences? 
Clearly the overwhelming  importance  of expectations in asset market 
models  and  the  inherent  difficulty  of empirically  measuring  expectational 
variables  imply  that some significant  sources of exchange  rate volatility 
remain  unquantifiable. 
EXCHANGE  RATE  VOLATILITY  AND  FUNDAMENTALS 
It is nonetheless  useful  to seejust how much  of exchange  rate  volatility 
can be related to past and contemporaneous  changes in the variables 
suggested  as determinants  of the exchange  rate  by asset market  models. 
Of course, if the exchange rate  anticipates  these variables,  as Sims has 
suggested for the interest rate, then its movements will appear  poorly 
explained.33  But it is worth trying to discover how important such 
problems seem to be, using an atheoretical methodology. Previous 
attempts at structural  modeling  of exchange rates have met with little 
success, and this failure  is not restricted  to the simpler,  single-equation 
models. Even large structural  models that take explicit account of the 
33. Christopher  A. Sims, "Comparison  of Interwar  and Postwar  Business Cycles: 
Monetarism Reconsidered,"  American  Economic  Review  (May  1980, Papers  and Pro- 
ceedings,  1979), pp. 250-57. 40  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
multicountry  general  equilibrium  nature  of exchange  rate  determination, 
such as the multicountry  model  (MCM)  developed  over the past decade 
at the Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, have met 
with limited  success in tracking  and  forecasting  short-run  exchange  rate 
fluctuations.34 
For this reason, an alternative  empirical  strategy  is adopted  below. 
No  a priori assumptions are imposed about speeds of adjustment. 
Although  the  econometric  approach  employed  is nonstructural  in  nature, 
it is possible (under assumptions equivalent to those used in single- 
equation  models)  to draw  some qualitative  conclusions  about  the ability 
of fundamentals  to explain  short-run  exchange  rate  volatility. 
In the reduced-form model developed below the change in the 
logarithm  of the bilateral (dollar-foreign  currency) exchange rate is 
related  to changes in the logarithm  of relative (U.S. to foreign)  money 
supplies, MI; changes in the logarithm  of relative output (industrial 
production);  changes  in the logarithm  of relative  prices (consumer  price 
index); changes in the short-term  (three-month)  nominal  interest rate 
differential;  and  the level of the two countries'  current  accounts  (or  trade 
balances,  when monthly  current  account  data  are  unavailable).35  All raw 
data are seasonally unadjusted  and seasonal dummies  are incorporated 
in estimation. 
The exchange rate equation is derived and estimated as part of a 
vector autoregressive  (VAR) system of equations  in which each of the 
seven variables-the exchange  rate  and  its six predicted  determinants- 
is regressed  on its own lagged  values  and  on lagged  values  of all the other 
34. A summary  of the various  approaches  to exchange  determination  attempted  within 
the  context  of the MCM  is described  in  Peter  Hooper  and  others,  "Alternative  Approaches 
to General Equilibrium  Modeling  of Exchange Rates and Capital Flows: The MCM 
Experience," International  Finance Discussion Paper  213 (Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  System, 1982). 
35. Much  of the data  used in  the  following  simulations  was  provided  by Richard  Meese 
and Kenneth  Rogoff. The exchange  rates, interest  rates, and money supplies  are aligned 
at end-of-month  dates. This alignment  of the data  helps  to capture  some of the announce- 
ment  effects of money and  interest  rates  on exchange  rates. Because  joint stationarity  of 
the regressors  is a key assumption  underlying  the existence  of a VAR  representation,  most 
variables  appear  as first  differences  of logarithms.  See Thomas  J. Sargent,  Macroeconomic 
Theory  (Academic  Press, 1979),  for  a discussion  of the  conditions  required  for  the  existence 
of VAR and MA representations  of a vector time series. Trade balances and current 
accounts  appear  in level form  because  the portfolio-balance  model  predicts  an association 
between the change in the exchange rate and the change in private  sector holdings  of 
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variables.36  Lag length  was selected using the likelihood  ratio  criterion. 
Then, to focus attention  on the importance  of unanticipated  movements 
in the determinants,  the estimated  VAR system is expressed  in terms  of 
its associated Wold  or moving  average  (MA)  representation.  In the MA 
system,  the change in the exchange rate is  expressed as a  linear 
combination  of current  and  past  unanticipated  movements  (disturbances 
or innovations)  in the explanatory  variables,  and  disturbances  further  in 
the past  are  given  progressively  less weight.  An unanticipated  movement 
in a variable in this context is defined as the forecast error from the 
VAR equation  for that  variable.37 
The disturbance terms in the moving average representation  are 
typically contemporaneously  correlated, which makes it difficult to 
provide a meaningful  definition  of a disturbance  to any single VAR 
equation.  As is standard  in  the  VAR  methodology,  the  MA  representation 
is transformed  before the simulations  are performed  in order  to obtain 
uncorrelated  disturbances.  Since we wish to place an upper  bound on 
the component  of exchange rate movements that can be explained  by 
innovations  in other variables, the particular  transformation  employed 
assumes that all contemporaneous  correlation  between the exchange 
rate  and  its determinants  reflects  causation  from  the latter  to the former. 
This assumption  is also commonly  used in the single-equation  exchange 
rate models that  abound  in the literature,  which assume that  the regres- 
sors are econometrically  exogenous.38 
To impose this assumption  during  the simulations  that are used to 
decompose the variance  of the exchange  rate change, several steps are 
required.  First,  before  simulation  the system  ofestimated  VAR  equations 
is ordered  so that  the exchange  rate  equation  appears  last. The ordering 
selected for the six remaining  variables  is (from  top to bottom):  relative 
output, relative prices, relative money, the U.S.  trade balance, the 
36. Significance  tests for  the variables  in the VAR  exchange  rate  equation  are  reported 
in the appendix. They indicate the importance  only of lagged values of the variables 
because  contemporaneous  effects are contained  in the disturbance  terms.  These contem- 
poraneous  effects are  incorporated  in the simulation  results  reported  in the text. 
37. These disturbances  include  the possible  effects of omitted  variables  that operate 
directly  on the exchange  rate  and  not through  the other  regressors,  including  the political 
or confidence  factors  that  are  often said  to influence  portfolio  preferences. 
38. The exogeneity specification  of popular  exchange  rate models  has been critically 
evaluated  by Glaessner.  See Thomas  Glaessner,  "A Test of the Exogeneity  Specifications 
of Models  of Exchange  Rate  Determination"  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
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other country's  current  account (or trade  balance  for the United King- 
dom),  and  the nominal  interest  rate  differential.39  The covariance  matrix 
of the estimated  residuals  is then used to transform  the system so that, 
during  simulations,  innovations  in variables  placed  higher  in the ordering 
of equations  are allowed to influence  contemporaneously  those below 
them, but not vice versa. This transformation  is tantamount  to incorpo- 
rating  contemporaneous  values of the six determinants  along  with their 
lagged  values in the exchange  rate  equation  before simulation.40 
Selection of an ordering  for the equations  of a VAR model is simply 
the econometric  identification  procedure  in another  guise. Choosing  an 
ordering  is equivalent to imposing enough identifying  restrictions to 
achieve a recursive  system in the classical  econometric  framework.  It is 
not surprising,  then, that  the ordering  has important  implications  for the 
allocation  of explanatory  power  among  the individual  determinants,  just 
as the selection of exclusion restrictions  influences  simulation  results  in 
a classical  econometric  framework.  The  primary  conclusions  highlighted 
below, however, are not a product  of the ordering  selected for the six 
determinants. 
VAR simulations  are  generally  used to decompose  the variance  of the 
forecast  error of the dependent  variable  at different  forecast horizons 
into the percentages  of the variance  attributable  to each of the explana- 
tory variables.41 Decompositions of the forecast error variance  of the 
change in exchange rates are provided  in figure  4 for the dollar-mark, 
dollar-yen,  and  dollar-pound  rates. The  percentage  that  is attributable  to 
disturbances  to each of the explanatory  variables  is plotted  for forecast- 
ing horizons of one to thirty-six  months. The part  of the forecast error 
variance  that is attributed  to own disturbances  is denoted  by the line s. 
39. The  following  considerations  have  guided  the  choice  of ordering.  Because  exchange 
rates  and interest  rates react strongly  to contemporaneous  events, they are placed  at the 
end of the ordering.  The placement  of the price  and  output  variables  before  the monetary 
variable  reflects  the desire to allow for a reaction  function  of the monetary  authorities. 
Placement  of trade  and  current  accounts  near  the end of the ordering  is consistent  with  the 
view that  they have little  effect on relative  prices  and  output  in the current  period  but  that 
they may  be somewhat  sensitive  to contemporaneous  disturbances  in these variables. 
40. More precisely, the covariance  matrix  of estimated  residuals  is lower triangular- 
ized. See the discussion  of VAR  simulation  methodology  in Robert  J. Gordon  and  Stephen 
R. King, "The Output  Cost of Disinflation  in Traditional  and Vector Autoregressive 
Models,"  BPEA,  1:1982, especially  pp. 207-15. 
41. For other  examples  of this type of simulation-based  variance  decomposition,  see 
Christopher  Sims, "Macroeconomics  and  Reality,"  Econometrica,  vol. 48 (January  1980), 
pp. 1-48;  and  Stanley  Fischer,  "Relative  Shocks,  Relative  Price  Variability,  and  Inflation," 
BPEA, 2:1981, pp. 381-43 1. Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie  E. Loopesko  43 
Figure 4.  Decomposition  of the Variance in the Forecast Error 
for the Change in the Exchange  Ratea 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
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a.  The decomposition  is explained  by orthogonalized  disturbances to the explanatory  variables.  The variables are 
s, percentage change in the dollar-foreign currency exchange  rate; Ar, the change in the short-run interest differential; 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
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change  in relative  prices;  Cg, the German current account;  Ps,  the  U.S.  trade balance;  Cj, the Japanese  current 
account;  and  7Tk,  the U.K.  trade balance.  The  V* is the ratio of the variance in the forecast  error to the variance of 
the dependent  variable. When V* is close  to  1.0, the variance in the forecast  error approximately equals the variance 
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An intuitive  interpretation  can be given to these figures:  they tell what 
types of (orthogonalized)  disturbances  have caused the change in ex- 
change rates to deviate from its predicted  value at various forecasting 
horizons. The in-sample  simulation  evidence in figure  4 reinforces the 
out-of-sample  fit  results  reported  by Meese and  Rogoff  that  fundamentals 
help very little in forecasting  exchange  rates  over short  horizons.42  This 
is evident  from  the high  percentage  of the forecast  error  variance  that is 
not  explained by disturbances  to the fundamentals  (denoted by s) at 
horizons of less than six months. At longer horizons, disturbances  to 
fundamentals  account  for  more  of the  deviation  of the change  in  exchange 
rates  from  its predicted  level. 
A more important  issue is whether the high volatility of exchange 
rates during the past decade can be related to  movements in the 
theoretically  suggested  determinants.  To address  this issue, it is neces- 
sary to obtain a decomposition of the variance of the exchange rate 
change  itself,  rather  than  of its forecast  error.  An approximation  to this 
variance  can also be obtained  from  the above simulations.  The one-step- 
ahead forecast error  based on the MA system is simply the contempo- 
raneous  disturbance  appearing  in the MA representation;  the two-step- 
ahead  forecast error  incorporates  contemporaneous  and  first-lag  values 
of disturbances;  and  so on.43  As we use the  MA  representation  to forecast 
further into the future, each successive forecast error incorporates 
progressively more terms of the MA representation.  In this way, the 
42. Meese and  Rogoff, "Empirical  Exchange  Rate  Models." 
43. To see this, consider the following MA equation from a two-variable  system 
consisting  of variables  x,, and  x2,: 
Xi,=  u  +  allu,-1  +  al2u,2  +  * * 
+  a2lv11  +  a22Vt-2  + 
where  u and  v are  the disturbance  terms  from  the first  and  second  equations,  respectively. 
The one-step-ahead  forecast  error  is then 
xl,,+ I -  E,xl,,+  I =u,+  1- 
From the assumption  of stationarity, var(u,+  I) =  var(u,) =  (r2.  Thus the one-step-ahead 
forecast-error  variance  involves the variance  of the contemporaneous  term of the MA 
representation.  Similarly,  the two-step-ahead  forecast  error  is 
Xl,t+2  -  E,xl,t+2  =  Ut+2  +  aliu,+1  +  a2lv,+l, 
so that its variance is calculated from terms involving contemporaneous  and lagged 
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forecast  error  at very long horizons  yields a good approximation  of the 
entire  MA representation  of the dependent  variable  itself.44 
In figure  4 the V*  value  reported  in parentheses  beneath  each forecast 
horizon  is the ratio of the forecast error  variance  at that horizon  to the 
total variance  of the change in exchange rate. At forecast horizons for 
which  V*  is close to 1.0, the forecast  error  variance  closely approximates 
the variance  of the exchange rate change itself. A horizon  of thirty-six 
months  proved  sufficient  in all cases to obtain  a value of V*  close to 1.0. 
Variance decompositions are reported in table 3 for percentage 
changes  in the dollar-mark,  dollar-yen,  and  dollar-pound  exchange  rates 
from  March  1973  to August 1982.  The last row of the table indicates  the 
part of the variance of the change in exchange rates that cannot be 
attributed  to (orthogonalized)  innovations  in the six explanatory  vari- 
ables and is ascribed to own disturbances.  This part of the variance 
amounts  to 30 to 40 percent  and  is invariant  with respect to the ordering 
selected for the six other equations  placed before the exchange rate in 
the simulations.45 
A common  criticism  of the VAR methodology  is that  it only provides 
evidence  on the importance  of reduced-form  disturbance  terms  (forecast 
44. Because MA coefficients further  in the past become progressively  smaller  in a 
stable system, ignoring  the distant past of the theoretically  infinite, moving-average 
representation  may  not entail  much  loss of information. 
45. Given that the exchange rate is placed last in the ordering  for simulations,  the 
ordering  of the remaining  six equations  has no effect on the simple dichotomy  of the 
variance  of the exchange  rate  change  into  the part  attributable  to VAR  disturbances  in the 
six fundamentals  taken  together,  and  the part  explained  by own disturbances.  To see this, 
consider  a trivariate  VAR system of equations  for variables  x, y, and z that has been 
ordered  for simulations  and whose estimated  residuals  are (from  first  to last) ux,,  UV,  and 
uzi. These disturbances  are serially uncorrelated,  i.i.d. disturbance  terms that may, 
however, be correlated  with each other. When the covariance  matrix  of the estimated 
residuals  is orthogonalized  before simulation,  it is equivalent  to a redefinition  of the 
residuals  using  the following  hypothetical  regressions: 
ux,  =  ex,) 
U=  d1ux,  +  ev1, 
U=  d2ux1  +  d3uYI +  ezI. 
The  resulting  residuals-ex,, ey,,  and  ezi-are uncorrelated  with  each  other  by construction. 
The redefined  residual  for the last equation,  ez,,  is clearly  not influenced  by the ordering  of 
the two other  equations.  Hence when  the MA  equation  for z is used in simulations  to split 
the  explanatory  power  between  contemporaneous  and  lagged  values  of ez,  on the one hand, 
and  of ex,  and ev,  on the other,  the division  is invariant  with respect  to the ordering  of the 
two top equations. 48  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 3.  Variance Decomposition  of the Change in Exchange Rates, 
March 1973 to August 1982a 
Percentage of variance  accounted  for 
Dollar-mark  Dollar-yen  Dollar-pound 
Orthogonalized  innovation  rate  rate  rate 
Relative  output  9.1  8.6  19.4 
Relative prices  13.5  9.5  10.7 
Relative money  11.2  5.5  6.3 
U.S. trade  balance  9.1  9.0  8.4 
Other  country's  current  accountb  4.9  11.5  15.4 
Short-term  interest  differential  13.8  22.1  9.7 
Unexplained  (spot rate)  38.3  33.9  30.1 
Sources:  All  U.S.  data except  for the  trade balance  are from the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System.  Exchange  rates are noon  New  York spot bid market rates, aligned at end-of-month  dates  with the interest 
rates and money supplies.  Output variables are industrial production indexes from OECD, Main Ecorionoic  Indicators. 
Consumer price indexes  for Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are from the Monthly Report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  table VIII-7; Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics  Monithly, table 119(1); and Department of Employment, 
Emiployment Gazette,  table 6.4,  respectively.  The Ml  series  for the same countries  are from the Monithly Report of 
the Deutsche  Bundesbank,  table  1-2; the  Bank  of  Japan,  Ecorionoic Statistics  Monthly,  table  4;  and the  Bank  of 
England  Quarterly Bulletin,  table  1. Data on  trade balances  are from OECD,  Main Econonmic Indicators,  for the 
United Kingdom; and from U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Highlights  of  U.S.  Export anid Iniport Trade, tables  E-l  and 
1-1 through  1978, and Sunimary of  U.S.  Export and Iniport Merchandise  Trade through  1982 for the United  States. 
Current account data for Germany and Japan are from OECD, Main Ecorionoic  Indicators.  Interest rates for Germany, 
Japan, and the United  Kingdom are, respectively,  the three-month interbank rate from the Frankfurter Allegenmeine 
Zeitunig; the  "over  two-month  ends"  bill discount  rate (Tokyo  Stock  Exchange)  from the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
data base;  and the  three-month  deposit  rate for the  local  authority from the London  Financial  Times.  The  three- 
month Treasury bill rate is from the Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System. 
a.  The entries  in the table are the percentages  of the variance of the exchange  rate change that can be attributed 
to orthogonalized  VAR  disturbances  to each  of the explanatory  variables  shown.  The last row reports the percent 
of  the  variance  not  ascribable  to  disturbances  to  any  of  the  six  explanatory  variables,  which  is  then  residually 
attributed to exchange  rate disturbances.  The variables are presented  above  in the order in which they  were placed 
for simulation (see  the text  for a discussion  of the importance of the ordering for simulation). 
b.  Trade balance for the United  Kingdom. 
errors  from the VAR equations),  while the interesting  economic issues 
relate to the importance  of structural  disturbance  terms such as money 
demand  or aggregate  demand  shocks. The VAR model  can be viewed as 
the reduced-form  representation  of one or more  structural  exchange  rate 
models, so that each VAR disturbance  term  is a linear  combination  of a 
number  of structural  disturbance  terms.46  Then, unless the underlying 
structural model is  identified, it is  not possible to unscramble the 
structural  disturbances  from  the estimated  VAR disturbances. 
Although results on the importance of  VAR innovations cannot 
generally be translated  into evidence on the importance  of structural 
46. John  Taylor  discusses this point  in his comments  on a paper  by Stanley  Fischer  in 
BPEA, 2:1981, pp. 434-38. Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  49 
disturbances, some qualitative  conclusions concerning  the latter issue 
may be inferred  if additional  identifying  assumptions  are made. If, as in 
single-equation  exchange rate models, it is assumed  that the regressors 
in the exchange rate equation of the structural  model underlying  the 
VAR model are predetermined,  that structural  model must be block 
recursive. Then the exchange rate will not affect contemporaneously 
any of the other variables in the associated VAR system, and the 
disturbance  term  in the VAR  exchange  rate  equation  will  be independent 
of any of the other disturbance  terms. In this case, the structural  and 
reduced-form interpretations  of  the VAR exchange-rate innovation 
coincide: the innovation  represents  disturbances  to the exchange rate 
equation  that are not due to structural  disturbances  to any of the other 
variables  in the model. Under these assumptions,  the results in table 3 
may be interpreted  as evidence that 60 to 70 percent of exchange rate 
volatility can be ascribed to (structural  or VAR) disturbances  to the 
theoretically  suggested  explanatory  variables. 
Further inferences from the VAR evidence require even stronger 
identifying  assumptions. As noted earlier, in the presence of contem- 
poraneous  correlation  among  the estimated  VAR  disturbance  terms,  the 
allocation of explanatory  power among the individual  disturbances  is 
influenced  by the ordering,  so this decomposition  must be interpreted 
with more caution. In particular,  the allocation  of the variance  among 
reduced-form  innovations  using VAR-based  simulations  will only cor- 
respond to the more meaningful  allocation of the variance among the 
structural  disturbances  if the system is fully  recursive  (and  not  just block 
recursive). These results are summarized  briefly  here. For the dollar- 
mark  rate, disturbances  to relative  prices, the interest  differential,  and 
relative money account  for about  40 percent  of the variance  of changes 
in exchange rates. This evidence suggests the relative importance  of 
asset market  variables  and price developments. In addition  to relative 
price  and  interest  rate  disturbances,  disturbances  in the current  account 
are important  in explaining  the forecast error  variance  of the dollar-yen 
rate, despite having been placed below the other determinants  in the 
ordering  of equations. Disturbances  in the U.S. trade balance are also 
an important  source of volatility  of the dollar-pound  rate. The possible 
channels through which the current account or trade balance could 
influence  the exchange  rate  are discussed  below. 50  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
RANDOM  DATA  EXPERIMENTS 
From the above evidence it appears  that a substantial  proportion  of 
the volatility of exchange rates can be related to unanticipated  move- 
ments  in the theoretically  predicted  determinants.  One drawback  of the 
VAR methodology, however, is that it requires estimation of a large 
number  of coefficients relative to the small number  of monthly  obser- 
vations since the advent  of floating.  Together  with the likely collinearity 
among the many regressors, this implies that few of the coefficients 
are very precisely estimated. 
To illuminate  the empirical  importance  of this  problem,  an  experiment 
was conducted  for comparison.  In the experiment  the rate of change  of 
the exchange rate was regressed on its own past values and on past 
values of six series that  were created  using  a random  number  generator. 
The same number  of variables, lags, and seasonal dummies as in the 
VAR simulations  were included  in the experiments  to closely mirror  the 
conditions  for VAR estimation  using  actual  data. 
Table 4 compares the percentage of the variance of the change in 
exchange rates explained by orthogonalized innovations in the six 
explanatory  variables  in the earlier  VAR simulations  with  that  explained 
by innovations  in the six randomly  generated  data series in the experi- 
ments. Based on evidence from five repetitions of the random data 
experiments,  it appears  that, on average, the model based on the actual 
data explains the variance  of the exchange rate change only about 8 to 
16  percent  better  than  the models with  purely  randomly  generated  data. 
Thus  one must  conclude  that  much  of the short-run  volatility  of exchange 
rates  over the past decade remains  unexplained  by the variables  empha- 
sized in the models of the 1970s.  These results  reinforce  those from  out- 
of-sample  tests and  indicate  that  one can neither  explain  nor  predict  with 
any confidence a substantial  portion  of month-to-month  exchange rate 
volatility using even a very unrestricted  representation  of the asset 
market  models. 
MODEL  RESTRICTIONS 
While the VAR technique provides a way to assess whether the 
variables suggested by the asset market  models can explain exchange 
rates, it does not provide tests of the restrictions imposed by these Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  51 
Table 4.  Variance  Decomposition  of the Change in Exchange Rates, Actual Data 
versus Randomly  Generated  Data, March 1973 to August 1982a 
Percentage of variance  accounted  for 
Dollar-mark  Dollar-yen  Dollar-pound 
Item  rate  rate  rate 
Simulations  based on actual  data  61.7  66.1  69.9 
Average  for random  data experiments  53.4  52.9  53.9 
Range  for the experiments  48.4-59.5  49.7-58.1  43.5-67.5 
Improvement  gained  by using  actual  rather 
than  random  datab  8.3  13.2  16.0 
Sources:  Same as table 3. 
a.  Entries show  the percentage  of  the variance  of  the exchange  rate change  explained jointly  by orthogonalized 
innovations  in the six  explanatory  variables  (not including own  innovations)  for two data sets:  actual data-the  six 
variables  suggested  by  the  theoretical  models  (the  same  variables  as  in table 3); and random data-six  randomly 
generated series. 
b.  Difference  between  the first two rows. 
models. These restrictions  are at the heart of the policy debate. They 
determine  what influence  policies can have on the exchange rate, and 
they are an important  part  of the cases for and  against  resisting  changes 
in exchange  rates. 
For  example, the purchasing  power  parity  assumption  of the flexible- 
price monetary  model leads to the conclusions  that financial  policies do 
not affect the real  exchange  rate  and  that  there  is no need for authorities 
to be concerned  about the exchange rate anyway. Authorities  can and 
should focus their attention  on pursuing  a monetary  policy consistent 
with  domestic  price  stability.  The  model,  which  assumes  a stable  demand 
for money and rational  expectations, suggests that the right  way to do 
this is to follow a policy of constant money growth equal to the trend 
rate  of growth  of real  economic  activity. If the demand  for money moves 
erratically,  the problem  of finding  the optimal  monetary  policy is more 
complicated. But the essential insight of the flexible-price monetary 
model from an international  perspective is unaffected.  The best policy 
for  each country  and  for the world  as a whole  is for  authorities  to stabilize 
prices in their  own economies as best they can. 
In the sticky-price monetary model, the uncovered interest parity 
condition,  which follows from the assumptions  of perfect asset substi- 
tutability and rational expectations, is  the central relation yielding 
international  policy implications. Recall that uncovered interest rate 
parity  implies that the nonminal  interest rate differential  exactly equals 
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assets are perfect  substitutes,  authorities  cannot  expect to influence  the 
exchange rate by intervening in the foreign exchange market if the 
intervention  is sterilized-that is, if the stock of money is not allowed  to 
change. Sales of interest-bearing  assets denominated  in one currency 
for nonmoney assets denominated  in another  have no effect on asset- 
market equilibrium.  Moreover, intervention that is not sterilized is 
equivalent to a domestic open-market  operation  because it makes no 
difference  whether  an increase  in money is accomplished  by purchasing 
assets denominated  in domestic or foreign currency. Policies pursued 
abroad  also influence  macroeconomic  conditions  at home through  their 
effects on the real  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate. So economies are not 
insulated, and there are potential  advantages  to coordinating  domestic 
stabilization  policies among  countries.47 
If the uncovered interest parity condition holds, unstable currency 
preference can be ruled out as an important  influence on exchange 
rates, and this reason for intervention  to stabilize exchange rates can 
be rejected. Shifts in preferences  by some portfolio  holders  would then 
be absorbed  by other portfolio  holders  with no net effect on nominal  or 
real exchange rates. Similarly,  wealth redistributions  would not affect 
exchange rates. The market  would be self-stabilizing  with respect to 
disturbances of this type. At the same time, the case for allowing 
exchange  rates to influence  domestic  macroeconomic  policies would  be 
strengthened.  The exchange rate might  then provide  a useful indicator 
of economic  conditions  and  prospects  at home  relative  to those in  foreign 
economies. 
In the portfolio-balance  model, uncovered  interest  rate  parity  will not 
hold exactly. Imperfect  asset substitutability  implies  that interest-bear- 
ing assets denominated  in different  currencies are perceived to have 
different  risk  characteristics.  The  existence  of differential  risk-reflected 
in risk premiums  or discounts-allows  scope for sterilized exchange 
market  intervention  to influence  exchange rates, although  its impact  is 
less powerful dollar-for-dollar  than that of unsterilized intervention. 
47. The model  as presented  incorporates  a role only for monetary  policies. But in an 
elaborated  model,  which  incorporates  the influence  of fiscal  policy on aggregate  demand, 
varying  the mix of monetary  and  fiscal  policy  leads  to different  real  interest  rates  and  real 
exchange  rates  for a given level of aggregate  demand.  See the analysis  within  the context 
of a sticky-wage  monetary  framework  by Andre  Burgstaller,  "Flexible  Exchange  Rates, 
Rational  Expectations,  and  the Trade-off  between  Inflation  and  Unemployment,"  Discus- 
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This model also incorporates additional  determinants  of changes in 
exchange rates, including  the wealth redistribution  associated with a 
current  account  imbalance.  The exchange  rate  response  tends to reduce 
the current  account  imbalances  and  foster  external  balance.  But  if current 
accounts are most susceptible to transitory  disturbances  and respond 
slowly to changes  in exchange  rates, this adjustment  mechanism  would 
contribute  little to damping  current  account  imbalances. 
Tests of uncovered  parity  are tests of the  joint hypothesis  that assets 
denominated  in domestic and foreign currency  are perfect substitutes 
(the absence of a risk  premium)  and that expectations  are rational.  It is 
important  for policy purposes to determine which part of the joint 
hypothesis accounts for the failure  of uncovered parity  to hold. If, on 
the one hand,  the  failure  indicates  the existence of a risk  factor  consistent 
with the portfolio-balance  model, it implies a channel through  which 
sterilized intervention  could affect the exchange rate. The inability  of 
researchers  to relate  the observed deviations  from uncovered  parity  to 
the variables  that the portfolio-balance  model suggests makes it more 
difficult  to interpret  the results as evidence supporting  the existence of 
a risk premium.48  Even if the failure of uncovered parity could be 
interpreted  in this way, the question would still remain  whether inter- 
vention could improve  the allocation  of risk and resources  achieved by 
the free market. 
If, on the other hand, the failure of the tests  is  a reflection of 
expectations that do not fully and immediately  incorporate  new devel- 
opments  or overreact  (or  underreact)  to them, it would still  be necessary 
to understand  how  expectations  behave  and  how  they  might  be influenced 
by official actions in order to determine whether intervention could 
improve the situation. Also, from the basic principle  that it is best for 
policies aimed  at eliminating  market  imperfections  to act directly  at their 
source, information  about the source of any inefficiency  is essential to 
determining  if intervention  is in fact the optimal corrective strategy. 
Thus if there is a case for intervention  based on the uncovered  interest 
parity  tests, it is predicated  on knowledge  of the source of the rejection 
of the condition.  There  has been little research  along  these lines. 
We have already  called attention  to the failure  of purchasing  power 
48. See Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "In  Search  ofthe Exchange  Risk  Premium:  A Six-Currency 
Test Assuming Mean-Variance  Optimization,"  Jouirnal of  International  Money  and 
Finance,  vol. 1  (December  1982),  pp. 255-74. 54  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
parity  to provide  an accurate  short-run  characterization  of the behavior 
of exchange  rates  and  relative  prices. Fluctuations  in real  exchange  rates 
during  the past decade have been large and cumulative.  Evidence has 
also been cited from the literature  indicating statistically significant 
deviations  from the uncovered  interest  rate parity  condition. Failure  of 
this condition  to hold is commonly interpreted  as evidence supporting 
the portfolio-balance  model  and  contradicting  the sticky-price  monetary 
model. But tests of uncovered  parity  do not shed light on how well the 
central insight of the sticky-price monetary model-that  real interest 
rate  differentials  have an  important  influence  on the real  exchange  rate- 
accounts  for the broad  sweep of real  exchange  rate  movements  over the 
floating  rate period. If this mechanism  leaves much unexplained  over 
the past decade, it suggests  a role for the additional  factors  incorporated 
in the portfolio-balance  model to explain sustained and systematic 
deviations from uncovered interest parity. To look at this question, 
evidence is provided  below on how well real interest rate differentials 
explain  the broad  movements  of real  exchange  rates. 
UNCOVERED  INTEREST  PARITY  IN  THE  LONG  TERM 
It was noted earlier that the uncovered interest parity condition 
implies that the expected percentage  change in the real exchange rate 
will equal the real interest rate differential  observed across countries. 
Thus the uncovered  interest  rate  parity  condition  is expressed as 
=  r* +  Se 
where, as before, r is the nominal  interest  rate;  s is the change  (over the 
same horizon  as the interest  rate)  in the logarithm  of the exchange  rate; 
e denotes an expected value conditional  on information  available  at time 
t; and * denotes a foreign  variable.  Let Q denote the real  exchange  rate. 
By definition, 
lnQe  =  ln  Se  +  ln  Pe*  -  ln  Pe 
where, as before, P is the price  level. This relation  holds  for any horizon 
of expectations. 
From these relations, the following association can be derived be- 
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percentage  change in the real exchange rate (where again a lowercase 
level variable  indicates  a percentage  change): 
q=  (r  -  pe)  -  (r*  -  pe*). 
If equilibrium  is expected to be restored  by some date T periods in the 
future, the deviation of the logarithm  of the real exchange rate today 
from  its equilibrium  value, ln Q, must  equal  the compounded  real  return 
differential  from now to date T (or any period, N, further  in the future 
than T). In logarithmic  form,49 
N-  I 
ln (Qt/Q)  =  -  E  [(rt+k 
-  Pe+k)  -  (r*+k  -  P*k)]  for  (N  -  T), 
k=o 
where rt+k  is the expected one-period  nominal  interest rate for period 
t + k. If the expectations  theory  of the term  structure  holds, the average 
expected nominal  interest rate over N years can be proxied by the N- 
period  bond rate. The deviation  from  the equilibrium  exchange  rate can 
be written  as N times the average  real  interest  differential  over N years, 
ln (Qt/Q)  =  -N[(r,  -  t) -  (r  - 
where r, is the average nominal  interest  rate on an N-period  bond with 
no coupon, and  p, is the average  expected inflation  rate  over N periods. 
This relation  is examined  below using  interest  rates on U.S. bonds of 
ten years' maturity  and foreign bonds of about the same maturity. It 
seems unlikely that portfolio managers  project current  monetary dis- 
equilibriums  further  into the future  than  this, so that  one can reasonably 
assume that equilibrium  is expected to be restored within ten years. 
Predicted  values for the real exchange rate are generated  from nominal 
interest rates and measures of expected inflation  rates under the as- 
sumptions  that  the long-run  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate, Q, has been 
constant  and that the uncovered  interest  parity  condition  has held over 
the past decade. A comparison  of the actual  and predicted  values of the 
real  exchange  rate  provides  an indication  of how well the exchange rate 
mechanism  in the sticky-price  monetary  model accounts for the broad 
swings  in real  exchange  rates  over the floating  rate  period. 
49. This  equation  uses the approximation  x  i  In  (1 + x) for a value  of x of the order  of 
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We  tested two proxies  for  expected inflation.  First,  a centered  twelve- 
month  moving  average  of actual  inflation-that is, the inflation  occurring 
at about the time expectations were formed-provides  a "myopic" 
measure of long-term inflationary  expectations. This measure works 
well if investors simply project  current  inflation  experience  far into the 
future. In contrast, an inflation  forecast based on rational  expectations 
weights all relevant available information  on the basis of its historical 
power  to predict  future  inflation.  The second proxy  is a rational  inflation 
expectations  series provided  by the VAR model  described  above. A ten- 
year average inflation series is constructed as the simple average of 
inflation  forecasts provided  by the VAR system for the subsequent  120 
months.S0 
Table 5 shows the regression  results and the percentage  of variation 
in the real exchange rate accounted  for by variation  in real interest  rate 
differentials, R2, using each of the expected inflation proxies. Real 
interest differentials calculated using the myopic expected inflation 
proxy explain a substantial  part  of the variation  in the dollar-mark  and 
dollar-yen  real exchange rates, but the rational  expectations  proxy has 
virtually  no explanatory  power. Moreover,  both  proxies  have the wrong 
sign  for  the  dollar-pound  real  exchange  rate,  and  the  rational  expectations 
proxy apparently  explains  a substantial  share  of the variation  in the real 
exchange rate. 
The empirical  results clearly do not strongly  support  an explanation 
for changes in exchange rates that depends on uncovered interest rate 
parity  with rational  expectations. The substantial  explanatory  power of 
half of the bivariate regressions reported  does, however, confirm  an 
important  connection  between interest  rates  and exchange  rates even if 
that  connection  is very different  for the pound  than  for the mark  and the 
yen. 
Figure  5 shows how movements  of real  exchange  rates  correspond  to 
movements  of real interest  rate  differentials  based on the myopic  proxy 
for inflation  expectations. The real exchange rates are shown together 
with  the regression  predictions  and  a priori  predictions  that  are  calculated 
using a value of ln Q equal  to the sample  mean  of ln Q and a coefficient 
of 10  on the real  interest  rate differential,  corresponding  to the approxi- 
50. An alternative  approach  would  be to estimate  the long-run  expected real  interest 
rate differential  using the observed time-series  process for short-run  real differentials. Jeffrey R.  Shafer and Bonnie E. Loopesko  57 
Table 5.  The Relation between the Long-Term  Real Interest Rate and the Real 
Exchange Rate, August 1973 to March 1982a 
Myopic  inflation  expectations  Rational  inflation  expectations 
Real  Real 
interest  interest 
Dependent  rate  rate 
variable  Constant  differential  R2  Constant  differential  R2 
Dollar-mark  rate  -  1.49  - 2.74  0.42  -  1.46  -  1.20  0.04 
(0.013)  (0.321)  (0.022)  (0.563) 
Dollar-yen  rate  - 6.04  - 2.19  0.51  - 6.04  0.72b  0.01 
(0.009)  (0.212)  (0.019)  (0.74) 
Dollar-pound  rate  0.66  0.35b  0.01  0.64  4.93b  0.59 
(0.017)  (0.421)  (0.008)  (0.397) 
Source:  Authors'  least-squares  regression,  In Q  =  a  +  b [(r, -  Inp,)  -  (r,  -  Inp,  )]. Results  are reported for 
real interest  rate differentials  constructed  using the myopic  and rational expected  inflation proxies  described  in the 
text. 
a.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
b.  The regression  coefficients  are of the wrong sign. 
mate ten-year maturity of the interest rates.5' The figure shows no 
correspondence  between real exchange rates and real interest  differen- 
tials for 1973-74, the period of initial adjustment  to floating  exchange 
rates  and the first  oil shock. But after 1975,  and particularly  since 1979, 
the actual and predicted  series for the dollar-mark  and dollar-yen  real 
exchange  rates  correspond  more  closely. The  a priori  predictions  suggest 
that the very large real depreciations  of the mark  and yen against the 
dollar in recent years are roughly commensurate  with movements of 
interest rates and inflation rates if one is prepared to entertain the 
hypothesis  of myopic  inflation  expectations. 
The question  remains,  why do the rational  expectations  proxies give 
poor results? These proxies for inflation  over ten years are relatively 
insensitive  to current  inflation  or to disturbances  in the other  variables- 
the proxies for the inflation  differential  range over an interval of less 
51. The estimated  coefficients  reported  in table 5 are considerably  smaller  than the 
a priori  value of 10, but considerable  deviations  of the estimated  coefficients  from their 
a priori  values should  not be surprising  given: (1) coupon payments  on bonds  for which 
market  interest  rates  are  available  that  give more  weight  to near-term  interest  rates in the 
yield to maturity  calculation  of the geometrical  average  interest  rate over the life of the 
bond;  (2) tax considerations,  which  are ignored;  (3) measurement  error  in the differential 
for the real  interest  rate-especially in the expected  inflation  component;  and  (4)  the long- 
run  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate,  Q, which  may  not be constant. 58  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Figure 5.  Long-Run  Uncovered  Interest Rate Parity under Myopic 
Inflation  Expectations 
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than 4 percent. This flatness may be largely  a consequence of the way 
the  proxies  were calculated-forecasts for  monthly  inflation  differentials 
tend to converge to their mean values in the first  few years so that the 
ten-year  average  forecasts remain  near  their  average  values. Ideally  one 
would prefer  to have long-run  inflation  forecasts that give more weight 
to longer-run  developments, but with a sample period of less than ten 
years, there  are  few observations  on lower-frequency  phenomena.  Still, 
the rational  forecasts seem justified on two grounds. First, diagnostic 
tests did not suggest that longer lags should be included. Second, one 
could reasonably  expect average  inflation  differentials  over a period  as 
long as ten years to correspond  more closely to average  inflation  over a 
comparably  long past period  than  to current  inflation.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests  that  the markets  for the yen and mark  may have been 
heavily  influenced  by near-term  inflation  experience.52 
Uncovered interest parity  does not seem to offer an explanation  for 
movements  in  the dollar-pound  exchange  rate.  A number  of explanations 
come immediately  to mind, including  the phasing  out of the reserve role 
of the pound  for the first  half  of the period,  capital  controls  in the United 
Kingdom  before 1979, and the effect of oil prices and North Sea oil 
developments  on market  assessments of the competitive  position  of the 
United Kingdom's economy. But a priori one would have had little 
reason  to expect these factors to be more important  for the pound  than 
similar  factors  would be for the other  currencies. 
The strong  perverse  relation  for the dollar-pound  exchange  rate  based 
on the rational  inflation  expectations proxy also calls for explanation. 
As for the other currencies,  the time series for this proxy is essentially 
flat. Thus the perverse relation is primarily  one between the nominal 
interest  rate differential  and the exchange rate. This may well reflect a 
greater tendency of the authorities in the United Kingdom to move 
interest rates in response to pressures in the exchange market. Such 
behavior  was most evident in 1976  and 1977  as authorities  in the United 
52. Steve Golub, "International  Financial  Markets,  Oil Prices,  and  Exchange  Rates" 
(Ph.D.  dissertation,  Yale  University,  1983),  has  also explored  the  relation  between  interest 
rates and inflation  by taking  cumulative  ex post realized  real inflation  differentials  as a 
proxy  for rational  expectations.  He finds,  as we do with  our rational  expectations  proxy, 
that  persistent  differentials  cannot  explain  exchange  rates  very well. See also Peter  Isard, 
"An Accounting Framework  and Some Issues for Modelling How Exchange Rates 
Respond to the News," in Jacob A. Frenkel, ed., Exchange Rates and International 
Macroeconomics  (University  of Chicago  Press,  forthcoming). 60  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Kingdom  raised interest rates sharply  when the pound weakened and 
moved  them  down again  when it recovered. 
This analysis of interest rates, inflation, and real exchange rates 
provides some evidence supporting  the sticky-price  monetary  model's 
predicted  relation  between the real  interest  differential  across countries 
and changes in the real exchange rate. But the results are not robust, 
and  the relation  fits  best under  a myopic  view of expectations  that  seems 
inconsistent  with  rationality.  This  latter  result  suggests  a need  for  further 
study to determine  whether  the apparent  expectational  anomalies  do in 
fact exist. If they do, are they specific to exchange markets  or can they 
be related to behavior in other asset markets,  particularly  to the term 
structure  of interest  rates and capital  investment  markets? 
THE  ROLE  OF  THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT  AND  TRADE  BALANCE 
While the VAR evidence (including the results in the appendix) 
provides some support  for the relative  importance  of the trade  balance 
or current  account in explaining  fluctuations  in some exchange rates, 
that effect has not been constrained in estimation to pass through  a 
portfolio-balance  channel. There are other hypotheses indicating  that 
current  accounts  should  influence  the path  of the exchange  rate.  It seems 
unlikely that the portfolio-balance  channel can explain the strength  of 
the often-noted  association  between current  account  deficits  and depre- 
ciation or current  account surpluses  and appreciation.  It is implausible, 
for example, that the portfolio-balance  mechanism  was the cause of the 
pronounced  dollar  depreciation  accompanying  the U. S. current  account 
deficit  pattern  in 1977  and 1978.  The effect of the $28  billion  cumulative 
U. S. current  account  deficit  on net U. S. private  sector  holdings  of foreign 
assets was swamped by concurrent  intervention  of more than double 
that  amount."3  Moreover,  in many  years, the effect of government  deficit 
financing  operations  on wealth and relative domestic and foreign  asset 
stocks  far  outweighs  that  of current  account  imbalances.  Current  account 
imbalances  could also have an impact  on goods market  equilibrium.  But 
the wealth effect of government deficits again can more than offset 
wealth transfers  induced by the current  account, so that any potential 
53. See Peter Hooper and John Morton, "Fluctuations  in the Dollar:  A Model of 
Nominal  and Real Exchange  Rate Determination,"  Journal of International Money and 
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effects of current  accounts on goods markets  might  easily be offset by 
other  forms of asset accumulation.S4 
This leads one to suspect that  forces other  than  the portfolio  balance 
mechanism  may be at work. One possibility that has been explored in 
recent work is that unanticipated  developments  in the current  account 
or trade balance provide new information  about a country's evolving 
competitive  position  and  hence about  the exchange  rate  level consistent 
with long-run current account balance."5  Thus the current account 
may signal required  long-run  exchange rate adjustments  and so have a 
significant short-run influence on the exchange rate. The practical 
limitation  of this version of the current  account-exchange  rate nexus is 
that it provides  little guidance  on the difficult  empirical  question  of how 
best to model  the expected long-run  equilibrium  exchange  rate. 
This signaling  hypothesis, favored by proponents  of the monetary 
model, provides no direct channel through  which the current  account 
can affect the exchange rate and thus suggests that it is only current 
account  innovations  that  affect the exchange  rate.56  Some findings  have 
indicated  the importance  of current  account  news, although  there  is also 
evidence indicating  that anticipated changes in the current account 
matter.S7 
54. The impact of wealth transfers  induced by the current  account on the goods 
market  has  been  explored  by Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Stanley  Fischer  in "Exchange  Rates 
and the Current  Account," American  Economic  Review, vol. 70 (December  1980),  pp. 
960-71; and Guillermo  A. Calvo and Carlos  Alfredo  Rodriguez,  "A Model  of Exchange 
Rate  Determination  under  Currency  Substitution  and  Rational  Expectations,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy,  vol. 85 (June 1977), pp. 617-25. 
55. See Hooper and Morton,  "A Model"; Isard, "An Accounting  Framework";  or 
Michael Mussa, "The Role of the Current  Account in Exchange Rate Dynamics," 
Discussion  Paper  (University  of Chicago,  June 1980). 
56. Unless wealth is incorporated  in the money demand  function. See Pentti J. K. 
Kouri,  "The  Exchange  Rate  and  the Balance  of Payments  in the Short  Run  and  in  the Long 
Run: A Monetary Approach,"  Scandinavian Journal of Economics,  vol. 78, no. 2 (1976), 
pp.  280-304;  orJeffrey  A. Frankel,  "The  Mystery  of the  Multiplying  Marks:  A Modification 
of the Monetary Model,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 64 (August 1982), pp. 
5 15-19. 
57. For  a theoretical  model  exploring  the  importance  of the  current  account  see Mussa, 
"The Role of the Current  Account." Frenkel  and  Dornbusch  provide  empirical  evidence 
on the role of news in exchange rate determination  in Jacob A. Frenkel, "Flexible 
Exchange  Rates, Prices and the Role of 'News': Lessons from the 1970s,"  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 89 (August  1981),  pp. 665-705;  and  Dornbusch,  "Exchange  Rate 
Economics." Dornbusch  modeled  current  account news as the difference  between the 
actual value and the value predicted  by the OECD. Evidence is provided  in Bonnie E. 
Loopesko, "The Role of Current  Account  Imbalances  in Exchange  Rate Determination: 62  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
ARE  EXCHANGE  RATE  RESPONSES  NONLINEAR? 
A number  of observers of exchange markets have suggested that 
exchange rates overreact to some new information  relative to what 
would  be expected under  rational  expectations.  Overreaction  could  take 
many  forms.  Testing  for it depends  on having  a model  that  places  bounds 
on the appropriate  response. Here we simply examined  whether large 
changes  in fundamentals  are associated  with more  than  proportionately 
large changes in exchange rates, behavior that would be inconsistent 
with linear  models. 
To see whether  the market  responds  more strongly  to large  changes 
in other  economic indicators,  the change  in the log of the exchange  rate 
was regressed  on the same variables  as in the earlier  VAR system, and 
on squared  values of the first  two lags of the determinants.  The signs of 
the original  observations  were preserved,  so that these terms  represent 
disproportionately  large  or small  changes  in the same direction  (positive 
or negative). If the true model were linear  in all the determinants,  the 
finding  that the squared  terms are significant  could indicate a market 
overreaction  to recent information. 
The results in table 6 indicate that there is  some evidence of a 
disproportionate  response by the market  to large recent developments 
in the determinants  of the exchange rate. There is no evidence of 
nonlinear response for the dollar-pound  rate, but some  significant 
nonlinear  response terms are found for the dollar-mark  and dollar-yen 
rates. There is no well-defined  pattern  to the results. All that can be 
concluded  is that these two exchange  rates react more strongly  to large 
changes  in some of their  determinants  than  would  be predicted  by simple 
linear  models. 
At best, these results suggest an avenue for further  research. More 
generally,  further  empirical  research  is required  into other  theoretically 
suggested  sources of market  inefficiency  such as bubbles,  bandwagons, 
and extraneous  beliefs about the determinants  of exchange rates."8  It is 
Competing  Hypotheses  and  Empirical  Evidence,"  Research  Paper  8236  (Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of New York,  December  1982),  indicating  that  it is notjust  news, but  also  anticipated 
current  accounts,  that  affect  the exchange  rate. 
58. For  a discussion  of these  phenomena  in  the  context  of rational  expectations  models, 
see Oliver  Jean Blanchard,  "Speculative  Bubbles,  Crashes  and  Rational  Expectations," 
Economics Letters, vol. 3, no. 4 (1979), pp. 387-89; Oliver Jean Blanchard  and Mark 
Watson,  "Bubbles,  Rational  Expectations  and  Financial  Markets"  (Harvard  University, 
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Table 6.  Nonlinearity  Tests, March 1973 to August 1982a 
Significance  level of squared  variables 
Dollar-mark  Dollar-yen  Dollar-pound 
Variable  rate  rate  rate 
Relative  outputs  8.7*  90.0  14.1 
Relative  prices  62.2  8.5*  44.2 
Relative  money  55.6  44.4  28.7 
U.S. trade  balance  56.8  64.5  70.0 
Other  country's  current 
accountb  60.2  79.2  19.1 
Short-term  interest  differential  76.0  5.1*  70.0 
Exchange  rate  0.6**  6.6*  91.7 
All nonlinearity  terms taken 
together  15.7  18.4  48.4 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on data from sources  in table 3. 
*  Marginal significance of at least  10 percent. 
**  Marginal significance  of at least  5 percent. 
a.  Marginal significance levels  are reported above  for F-tests  of the joint significance of two lags of sqluared values 
of the explanatory variables,  with original signs of the observations  preserved.  The equation also includes  six lagged 
values  of  each  explanatory  variable  (unsquared),  so  that the  squared values  are rough indicators  of  the  nonlinear 
response  of the exchange  rate to movements  in its determinants. 
b.  Trade balance for the United  Kingdom. 
not only important to determine whether the exchange  rate moves  too 
much in relation to economic  variables but also why it may overreact, in 
order to determine whether intervention provides the most direct means 
to eliminate the problem. Attempts to address the latter issue will most 
likely have to focus on the microeconomic  decision process in exchange 
markets. 
Exchange  Rate Behavior  and Policy 
What can be said about exchange rate policy when no existing model 
is strongly supported by the data? Should exchange  rates be managed 
Price Level Bubbles:  The First Tests," Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 88 (August 
1980),  pp. 745-70. Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  show that  even minimal  government  interventions 
can prevent  speculative  price  bubbles  in Maurice  Obstfeld  and Kenneth  Rogoff, "Specu- 
lative Hyperinflations  in Maximizing  Models: Can We Rule Them Out?" Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 91 (August 1983),  pp. 675-87. McKinnon  and also Dornbusch 
relate  the discussion  to the foreign  exchange  market.  See Ronald  I. McKinnon,  "Floating 
Foreign  Exchange  Rates 1973-74:  The Emperor's  New Clothes," in Karl Brunner  and 
Allan H. Meltzer, eds.,  Institutional Arrangements and the Inflation Problem,  Carnegie- 
Rochester  Conference  Series  on Public  Policy,  vol. 3 (Amsterdam:  North  Holland,  1976), 
pp. 79-114;  and  Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Equilibrium  and  Disequilibrium  Exchange  Rates," 
Zeitschriftffur Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften,  vol.  102, no. 6 (1982), pp. 573-99. 64  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
more  heavily  or even fixed  once again?  And, if so, how should  this policy 
be carried  out? Policymakers  must choose exchange rate and macro- 
economic policies despite the absence of clear answers to theoretical 
and empirical  questions. What  is more, there is little reason to expect 
that  the fog of uncertainty  will be dissipated  soon. 
The very fact of uncertainty-about economic behavior and about 
future  shocks-needs  to be kept  at the center  of policy discussions.  With 
considerable uncertainty about key structural  relations, policies that 
avoid disastrous consequences under a broad range of models are 
preferable  to policies that are optimal  for a strict interpretation  of one 
model but would serve very badly for other plausible  models. In addi- 
tion, flexibility  of policies is desirable  when the world economy seems 
vulnerable  to large  shocks, both real and  monetary. 
One positive conclusion seems well established after ten years of 
experience  with  floating  exchange  rates:  countries  are  not insulated  from 
disturbances  or policies in other  countries  by a strong  purchasing  power 
parity relation  between exchange rates and relative prices. At a mini- 
mum,  the interdependence  of macroeconomic  developments  indicates  a 
need to  take external developments into account when developing 
strategies  for domestic macroeconomic  policy. 
To carry the policy discussion further  than these general  considera- 
tions, one must  go well beyond what  can be established  about  exchange 
rate  determination  on the basis of strong  statistical  evidence concerning 
aggregative  relations.  In this section more  concrete  views are  offered  on 
policy issues that reflect  a plausible,  but not strictly  empirically  proven, 
interpretation  of the evidence. These views also reflect  judgments  on a 
number  of issues not addressed  in the paper.  Three  should  be made  clear 
at the outset. First, it is taken  for granted  that  cumulative  fluctuations  of 
the real  exchange  rate  on the order  of 10  or 20 percent  that  are sustained 
for six months  or more have important  effects on trade  flows, domestic 
economic activity, and inflationary  processes, even in an economy as 
large  and relatively  self-contained  as that of the United States. It is less 
clear, however, that exchange rate volatility over shorter  periods has 
large real effects. Second, responsibility  and accountability  for macro- 
economic  performance  are  viewed as unlikely  to be shifted  from  national 
governments  to some international  body. Policy proposals have little 
chance of practical  implementation  if they require  authorities  to subor- 
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controls on capital flows or the use of trade restrictions and trade 
subsidies would be desirable or even effective in managing  exchange 
rates. We draw  a sharp  distinction  between these policies, which seek 
to supplant  or frustrate  market  processes, and  central  bank  intervention 
in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  which  seeks to influence  markets  through 
the management  of the government's  own assets and liabilities  such as 
foreign  currency  reserves,  high-powered  money,  and  nonmonetary  debt. 
The major  policy  issues can  be grouped  into  four  categories:  exchange 
rates and monetary  policy, the monetary and fiscal policy mix with 
floating  exchange rates, international  coordination  of macroeconomic 
policies, and sterilized intervention in the exchange market. After 
discussing  each of these, we conclude  with our  views on the desirability 
of returning  to fixed  exchange  rates. 
EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  MONETARY  POLICY 
To the extent  that  exchange  rates  reflect  real  interest  rates, they could 
be a useful guide to monetary  policy when money demand  is unstable 
and inflation expectations cannot be observed with much precision. 
Using the exchange rate in this way would involve, in effect, inverting 
the argument  underlying  our  predictions  of exchange  rates  from  nominal 
interest rates and expected inflation rates. Some inferences about 
inflation expectations relative to interest rates could be made from 
exchange  rate  movements,  although  a rigid  response  of monetary  policy 
to exchange rate developments would presume a tighter  relation  than 
seems to exist. The evidence on the relation  between real interest  rates 
and exchange rates from our crude experiments is mixed. Monetary 
factors do not seem to provide  the entire story of exchange rates. And, 
even if they did, allowance  would have to be made  for developments  in 
other  countries. 
A  second reason for using the exchange rate as an indicator of 
monetary  policy is that the deviations  of real exchange rates from their 
long-run  values, owing  to disturbances  in a world  with sticky  prices, will 
affect export- and import-competing  sectors and hence aggregate  de- 
mand and inflation  with a lag. Thus a given monetary  growth rate or 
interest rate may be more or less restrictive  depending  on whether  the 
currency  is strong  or weak. 
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the exchange  rate  in monetary  policy rather  than  a central  or mechanical 
role. But its potential  value as an indicator  warrants  closer study. 
MONETARY  AND  FISCAL  POLICY  MIX  UNDER  FLOATING 
EXCHANGE  RATES 
The  greater  freedom  of monetary  policy under  flexible  exchange  rates 
can easily contribute  to a neglect  of the stabilization  role of fiscal  policy. 
A balance  of monetary  and  fiscal policy is important,  however, to avoid 
cumulative distortions in trade and investment. There is a risk that 
budget  imbalances  will go unchecked  long enough  to alter  international 
competitive positions and to affect capital formation. The greatest 
difficulty  results from persistent  budget  deficits. The inflationary  pres- 
sures created  by the fiscal impetus  will need to be contained  by greater 
monetary  restraint  and higher  real interest rates and the currency  will 
appreciate. Higher real interest rates will reduce domestic capital in- 
vestment, while a stronger currency will reduce the current account 
balance and generate a corresponding  shift toward an inflow of funds 
from  abroad  on the capital  account  of the balance  of payments.  Because 
of the real interest  rate sensitivity of domestic saving  and investment,  a 
capital inflow smaller than the government  deficit will balance supply 
and demand for funds in domestic markets. Thus net capital inflows 
cannot  prevent  domestic  capital  formation  from  being  crowded  out even 
if international  capital flows are perfectly elastic with respect to the 
expected rate of return.  Moreover, any net flow of funds from abroad 
entails an erosion of the competitive positions of exporters and those 
competing  with imports. 
INTERNATIONAL  POLICY  COORDINATION 
The large fluctuations  in real exchange rates over the floating rate 
period, interpreted  within a sticky-price  monetary  or portfolio-balance 
model, suggest strongly that economies are not insulated from what 
happens abroad. Consequently, even governments  that pursue purely 
national objectives should seek close consultation and exchange of 
information  on economic developments. Such consultations  would be 
essential, for example, to the informed  use of the exchange rate as an 
indicator  for monetary  policy. 
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small  number  of large  countries  means  that  cooperative  policies  involving 
international  quid  pro  quo or the acceptance  of international  constraints 
on policies should be superior  to unilateral  national policies, even if 
these are informed  by international  consultation  on economic develop- 
ments  and  intentions.  But  it is not  obvious  that  the major  macroeconomic 
problems  of the past ten years could have been solved simply  by more 
cooperative policies. Large shocks in the world economy and the 
breakdown  of economic relations that had guided policy in the 1960s 
overwhelmed  policymakers.  Ad hoc cooperative  policy  packages,  which 
are  seen by all parties  to offer  near-term  advantages,  can be put  together 
within the existing international  consultative framework of  summit 
meetings  and many  lower-level  meetings. Still, examples of agreement 
on substantive  policy trade-offs  are rare, presumably  because cases in 
which  all parties  expect net benefits  are unusual. 
Adding more structure  to policy coordination  seems politically im- 
practical and of questionable economic advantage. The uncertainty 
surrounding  the effects of policies and  the risk  of shocks make  the long- 
term benefits of a systematic exercise of cooperation  doubtful.  Under 
these conditions, governments  can hardly  be expected to accept even 
short-term  constraints  on policies. 
STERILIZED  EXCHANGE  MARKET  INTERVENTION 
Exchange  market  intervention  that  is divorced  from  domestic mone- 
tary  policy has been advocated  by many  as a policy instrument.  Indeed, 
considerable  intervention, much of it sterilized, has been undertaken 
during  the floating  rate  period.  The effects of sterilized  intervention  have 
not been explicitly analyzed in this paper, but the analysis presented 
bears  indirectly  on this issue.59 
59. We have not explored  here  directly  the question  of the effects of foreign  exchange 
market  intervention  using publicly available  data on official foreign exchange market 
transactions.  A multinational  study of the effects of intervention,  in which the authors 
participated,  has recently been completed using, in part, data unavailable  to outside 
researchers.  The results  of this study  indicate  that  the effect of sterilized  intervention  will 
be short-lived;  sterilized  intervention  cannot  reverse  the  exchange  rate  effects  of divergent 
policies across countries;  and the effect of coordinated  intervention  by several central 
banks  will be greater  than  the same volume  of intervention  by a single  central  bank.  See 
"The  Report  of the Working  Group  on Exchange  Market  Intervention"  from  the Working 
Group  on Exchange  Market  Intervention,  a group  established  at the Versailles  Summit  of 
the Heads  of State  and  Government  in March  1983. 68  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
The current  state of understanding  of exchange  rate  behavior  (or  lack 
thereof) argues  for a flexible and exploratory  intervention  policy. The 
evidence on  deviations from covered interest parity points to  the 
possibility that sterilized intervention  could have an influence  on ex- 
change rates, although competing explanations for these deviations 
would suggest different channels through which intervention would 
affect exchange rates. The strong case for not intervening  is based on 
the view that changes in the exchange  rate  reflect  current  and  rationally 
forecasted  future  economic developments  and policies. We find a large 
component of exchange rate volatility that cannot be related to the 
variables included in the VAR model. The possibility that exchange 
rates  are excessively volatile because of unstable  portfolio  demands  for 
assets denominated  in different  currencies,  or  because  of volatile  market 
psychology and bandwagons, must be taken seriously. The issue be- 
comes a question of whether authorities  are wise enough to sort out 
exchange  rate  changes  attributable  to these largely  unobservable  factors 
from more fundamental  developments, which may also be difficult  to 
observe except with a long lag. An additional  case can be made that 
sterilized  intervention  should  also be used to moderate  deviations  of real 
exchange rates from long-run  equilibrium  values caused by disparities 
in monetary  conditions  across countries.  But such a policy would carry 
great  risk  of treating  one symptom  while leaving  the underlying  problem 
unresolved. It would seem better to attack such problems at their 
source-that  is, by giving some weight to exchange rates in monetary 
and  fiscal policy. 
Balancing  the possible benefits and risks of sterilized intervention, 
we advocate a cautious approach.  Where  there is strong  corroborating 
evidence that shifts in portfolio demand  are occurring  relatively inde- 
pendently of expectations, their effects on exchange rates might be 
neutralized.  One example  would be an announced  shift of asset prefer- 
ences motivated  by political considerations,  although  such events are 
likely to be rare. 
Intervention  that has as its objective reducing  intraday  and day-to- 
day fluctuations  in exchange markets  also warrants  serious considera- 
tion. Its justification  is not that short-run  volatility is very costly, but 
that  by reducing  short-run  volatility,  the longer-run  unexplained  swings 
in  rates  might  be moderated.  Most  active  participants  in  foreign  exchange 
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run  considerations  have little  or no weight  in  formulating  their  strategies. 
High  volatility  engenders  more  myopic  behavior  in market  participants, 
perhaps  because it causes longer-term  expectations  to be more loosely 
held. With longer-term  volatility roughly proportional  to day-to-day 
volatility,  the possibility  must  be taken seriously  that  rates fluctuate  for 
little  or  no  economic  reason  far  enough  and  long  enough  to have  important 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, and random income-redistributive 
effects. Official  action  to reduce  short-run  volatility  could  then  contribute 
to more stable long-run  behavior and a more stable world economy. 
Such an intervention  policy would not involve a cumulative  buildup  of 
large  official  foreign  currency  positions, nor  would  it attempt  to maintain 
exchange  rates at unsustainable  levels. Thus  the risks  would  be small. 
Fixed Exchange Rates for the Major Industrial Countries? 
Should the exchange rates of major industrial  countries be fixed? 
Implicitly  a negative answer has already been given to this question. 
Maintaining  fixed  exchange  rates  necessitates  a level of macroeconomic 
policy coordination  that was never achieved on a sustained  basis, even 
under  the Bretton Woods system. National  authorities  could not place 
the maintenance  of the system above national  economic goals. Only if 
political  mechanisms  evolved that provided  for supernational  responsi- 
bility and accountability  for the conduct of macroeconomic  policy and 
for international  transfer  payments to balance national  interests would 
a truly  fixed exchange rate system be likely to endure. Once par value 
changes  become an accepted way of relieving  pressures  that  build  up in 
a fixed-rate system, currencies are susceptible to speculative attack. 
This was evident in the final  years of Bretton  Woods and more  recently 
within the European Monetary System. Domestic policies are then 
deflected  from  course in efforts to maintain  the system, with little if any 
long-run  gain in exchange rate stability.  A flexible  exchange  rate  regime 
does not prevent authorities  from giving weight to an exchange rate 
objective in the conduct of  policy.  It only dispenses with a rigid 
commitment  to a particular  rate, which has never been more than a 
contingent  one  for sovereign  governments.  The  episodes  of most  extreme 
fluctuations  of exchange rates during  the floating  rate period occurred 
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weight in monetary  and fiscal policy, even so far as their effects on the 
domestic  economy were concerned. Moreover,  policies to reduce  vola- 
tility through coordinated intervention have not been pursued with 
enough  continuity  to develop mature  strategies.  Before exchanging  one 
extreme  policy for another,  it makes  sense to explore  the middle  ground 
more  thoroughly. 
APPENDIX 
Results of VAR  Estimation 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE  are reported  below for the VAR exchange rate 
equation  underlying  the simulations  discussed in the text. 
Table A-1. Determinants  of Changes in Exchange Rates, 
March 1973 to August 1982a 
Significance  level 
Dollar-mark  Dollar-yen  Dollar-pound 
Lagged  variable  rate  rate  rate 
Relative output  77.4  55.6  42.2 
Relative prices  17.7  80.1  40.7 
Relative money  44.0  67.0  90.0 
U.S. trade  balance  3.7*  62.3  30.6 
Other  country's  current 
accountb  0.3*  44.7  0.2* 
Short-term  interest  differential  4.8*  28.8  36.0 
Own lags  0.7*  78.6  67.6 
Statistic 
RI2  0.62  0.59  0.69 
Corrected  R2  0.25  0.07  0.17 
Q (30)c  23.4  18.9  21.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations,  based  on data  cited in table  3. 
* Marginal  significance  of at least 5 percent. 
a. Marginal  significance  levels of the F-statistics  for null  hypothesis  that, conditional  on lags  of the other  variables 
being  included  in the equation,  coefficients  on lagged  values  of the variable  considered  are not  jointly significant  (a 
low marginal  significance  level implies  the variable  is a highly  significant  determinant  of the exchange  rate  change). 
Using a likelihood  ratio test, lag lengths  of 6, 7, and 8 were selected for the dollar-mark,  dollar-yen,  and dollar- 
pound  exchange  rates, respectively. 
b. Trade  balance  for the United  Kingdom. 
c. The Q(k)  is the Box-Pierce  Q statistic,  which  indicates  whether  the first  k autocorrelations  of the residuals  are 
significantly  different  from  zero. Marginal  significance  levels for Q(30)  are 80 percent  for the dollar-mark  rate, 89 
percent  for the dollar-pound  rate, and  94 percent  for the dollar-yen  rate. A high  marginal  significance  level indicates 
that  there  is little evidence  of serial  correlation.  It is the probability  that the Q statistic  is at least as large  as shown 
if the first  k residuals  are, in fact, not autocorrelated. Comments 
and Discussion 
Ralph C. Bryant: This paper contains many perceptive observations 
about  the variability  of exchange  rates  and  does a good  job of summariz- 
ing the recent literature. It is thus a welcome addition to the papers 
presented  at earlier  meetings of the Brookings  Panel that focus on the 
international  aspects of macroeconomic  behavior  and  policy. 
The first half of the paper is a skillful  exposition of the evolution of 
theoretical  analysis and actual experience. The authors strain  a bit to 
force the chronology of  the theory to fit the chronology of  actual 
developments. (It is misleading,  for example, to portray  the portfolio- 
balance strand of the literature  as developing after the flex-price and 
sticky-price  monetary  models and as a response to awkward  facts that 
were not analyzed satisfactorily in those models.) As  the authors 
themselves point out, the assumptions  of purchasing  power parity  and 
uncovered interest rate parity have been shown not to hold in actual 
practice.  By now, therefore,  it is time to retire  the flex-price  and sticky- 
price  monetary  models  and  give them  less time  on the stage.  These minor 
criticisms notwithstanding,  the first half of the paper is insightful  and 
should  be useful background  for a variety  of readers  of this  journal. 
The second half of the paper is the more important.  In that part, in 
which the authors  use VAR analysis to try to "explain" exchange-rate 
movements, I  am skeptical of  their empirical generalizations. The 
discussion  of policy issues at the end  of the paper  is sound,  but  somewhat 
too agnostic. My comments  thus focus on these two areas. I summarize 
my doubts about the authors' VAR analysis and then offer, less cau- 
tiously than the paper, some conclusions about policy attitudes to 
exchange-rate  variability. 
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How does  an analyst "explain" the movement of an economic 
variable?  At a proximate  level, explanation  relies on causal premises 
embedded in a single behavioral relation of a structural  model. For 
example, changes in bank borrowing  at the Federal Reserve discount 
window  are typically  explained  by changes  in the federal  funds  rate, the 
discount  rate, and a scale variable  for the aggregate  size of bank  balance 
sheets. For a deeper  explanation,  however, one cannot  restrict  attention 
to  any single behavioral relation. In the case  of  discount-window 
borrowing,  for example, one wants to know why the federal  funds rate 
and the size of bank balance sheets behaved as they did, not merely 
that  borrowing  is proximately  dependent  on those variables.  One  is thus 
frequently  driven  to consider  an  entire  structural  model,  or at least major 
blocks of an entire  model, in which many  variables  are treated  as  jointly 
endogenous.  To explain  at that  level, one must  derive  the reduced-form 
and  final-form  versions of the structural  model. 
Where do exchange rates appear  in structural  models? If a model is 
specified  according  to today's best-practice  macroeconomic  theory for 
open economies, exchange rates (or a weighted-average  exchange rate 
serving  as a proxy  for all the bilateral  rates)  appear  as arguments  in many 
behavioral  functions-in  equations  for asset demand  and  liability  supply 
that serve as components of variables  for expected returns,  as a com- 
ponent of  many price variables, and hence in demand and supply 
functions  for  goods. Exchange  rates  are  also  present  in  income-statement 
and balance-sheet identities. Generally speaking, the exchange rate 
appears  throughout  the structural  equations  as a variable  on the right- 
hand  side. The exchange rate  itself, however, is not a left-hand  variable 
in any structural  equation. The exchange rate is like goods prices and 
interest rates-quintessentially endogenous  in the system of structural 
equations as a whole but not proximately  "determined"  in any single 
equation  or small subset of equations. 
In particular,  it is wrong to characterize  the exchange rate as just a 
component of goods prices, or just an asset price (even though it has 
many  of the attributes  of an asset price).  The exchange  rate  is not merely 
the relative  price of home and  foreign  goods. It is not merely  the relative 
price of home and foreign monies. It is not merely the relative  price of 
home and  foreign  securities.  It is all these, and more. 
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in principle no choice but to obtain the reduced-form  or final-form 
equations  of some structural  model.  ' 
Each behavioral  equation  in a structural  model typically includes a 
stochastic error term to  allow for unexpected disturbances in the 
behavior  approximated  by that  equation.  Such  disturbances  ("shocks") 
have a clear conceptual interpretation.  In a structural  equation for 
discount-window  borrowing,  for example, one can interpret  the error 
term as an unexpected shift in bank demand;  with clarity, one can say 
such  a shock "originates"  in the market  for immediately  available  funds. 
On the other hand, interpretation  of the error  terms in the reduced- 
form equations of a model is not conceptually straightforward,  as the 
authors recognize. In the typical case, each reduced-form  error is a 
complex combination  of many structural  errors. Only if one knows the 
structure  of the model is it possible to unscramble  the reduced-form 
errors  into their complex, structural  components. And of course even 
when the structural  errors are contemporaneously  uncorrelated,  the 
reduced-form  errors will be correlated. In the typical case, it is not 
possible  to speak  of a composite, reduced-form  error  term  as originating 
in some one sector or market  in the model. 
It is true that if the structural  model happens to be recursive in a 
convenient  way, one can more  easily derive  the reduced-form  equations 
of the model and find that some of the reduced-form  errors are a less 
complex composite of the underlying  structural  errors.  For example, if 
the matrix of structural  coefficients associated with the contempora- 
neous values of the endogenous variables can be written in a lower 
triangular  form, the reduced-form  errors will have a correspondingly 
recursive structure.  For structural  models of open economies in which 
the exchange rate appears throughout  the behavioral  equations as an 
argument, however, this convenient recursiveness property will not 
exist. The theory alone is sufficient  to discount  that  possibility. 
Suppose  an analyst  had  available  a plausible  structural  model  and  had 
derived its reduced-form  and final-form  equations. He would then be 
1. It is instructive  to ask  which  economic  variables  in  a structural  model  are  not capable 
of significantly  influencing  the exchange  rate (that  is, given best-practice  theory, do not 
appear, contemporaneously  or as lagged values, in a reduced-form  equation  for the 
exchange  rate). As a matter  of theory, the list of such variables  is quite short, perhaps 
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able  to offer  a straightforward  explanation  of exchange-rate  changes.  Ex 
post he could identify unexpected disturbances  in the structural  equa- 
tions and interpret  them unambiguously.  He could study the relative 
frequencies  and  intensities  of those shocks. And  he  could  thereby  identify 
the "causes" of exchange-rate  changes and unambiguously  parcel out 
the variance  of the exchange  rate among  them. 
With these points as background,  now consider the VAR systems 
estimated  and used by Shafer  and Loopesko. Is it possible to use such 
systems to assess whether  the variables  featured  in asset market  models 
can "explain" changes in the exchange rate?  Can calculations  such as 
those in figure 4 and in table 3 of the paper indicate which types of 
unexpected disturbances  cause the exchange rate to deviate from its 
predicted  value? Is it valid to make inferences about the proportion  of 
the variance  of the exchange rate attributable  to disturbances  originat- 
ing in the foreign exchange market  itself rather  than being transmitted 
from other sectors of the economy? I believe the answer to all these 
questions is negative. 
If a nonstructural  VAR system is correctly to subsume a class of 
structural  models containing the true model, at least two necessary 
conditions  must be met. The VAR system must  include  all the variables 
appearing  in the true model (with as many lagged values of all the 
variables as appear  in the true model). And the true structural  model 
must contain a recursive pattern  in the contemporaneous  interactions 
among its endogenous variables. The VAR systems studied by the 
authors  are quite  unlikely  to satisfy either  of those conditions. 
First, the authors'  VAR systems omit a number  of variables  likely to 
be important.  For example, they contain no variable  genuinely repre- 
senting  monetary  policy. "Money," as conventionally  defined,  does not 
qualify. Even the theory in the simplified  models discussed in the first 
half of the paper, at least when presented  carefully,  makes it clear that 
the relevant money is central-bank,  high-powered  money. The VAR 
systems have no variables  representing  fiscal policy. Perhaps  the most 
puzzling omission of  all is  a variable representing the quantity of 
intervention  in the exchange  market,  the stock of international  reserves, 
or some other type of asset stock. Even the simplest  and least adequate 
of the portfolio-balance  theories  asserts  that  wealth,  at  home  and  abroad, 
belongs in the VAR systems. But the authors  include only changes in 
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If many variables  are included  in a VAR system, the problems  with 
degrees of freedom  tend quickly  to become unmanageable.  But that is a 
difficulty  with the technique,  not a valid  analytical  reason  for excluding 
the additional  variables. 
Another difficulty  with the Shafer-Loopesko  VAR systems is their 
treatment of all home and foreign variables as relative values. The 
practice of using variables  that are ratios, or differences, of home and 
foreign variables  is typical of the literature;  the authors  have plenty of 
company. Nonetheless, a chief argument  used to justify VAR analysis 
is its avoidance  of arbitrary  restrictions.  It is difficult  to imagine  a more 
arbitrary  assumption,  which is what this practice  comes down to, than 
presuming  that the behavior  parameters  in the nome and  foreign struc- 
tural  equations  are of the same magnitude. 
Still another weakness of the VAR systems in this paper is their 
ruthlessly bilateral  approach.  In the mark-dollar  system, for example, 
only German  and U.S. variables  are included.  Nothing that happens  in 
the rest of Europe or in the rest of the world can influence  the mark- 
dollar exchange rate except by sneaking  into one or more of the VAR 
residuals. 
The second necessary condition  for a VAR system to be valid, that 
the contemporaneous  interactions  among  endogenous  variables  follow 
a recursive  pattern,  seems also quite unlikely  to hold. As noted above, 
carefully  specified  models of an open economy with the exchange rate 
as an endogenous  variable  are even less likely  than  models  of a domestic 
economy to satisfy this condition. Certainly  for quarterly  data, and 
probably  for monthly data, most theories suggest that a contempora- 
neous, two-way correlation  will exist between many  pairs  of variables. 
For example, exchange rates influence  interest  rates and interest  rates 
influence exchange rates. Goods prices influence  exchange rates, but 
exchange rates probably  also influence  goods prices. 
Shafer and Loopesko acknowledge  that the disturbances  to which 
they refer in figure  4 and in table 3 are essentially reduced-form  errors, 
not structural  errors.  They note that  the reduced-form  errors,  or "VAR 
innovations,  " cannot  be given  a structural  interpretation  unless  a pattern 
of block or full recursivity  exists in the underlying  structural  model. But 
these conditions are quite implausible, as noted above. Yet it is a 
structural  interpretation,  and only a structural  interpretation,  that is of 
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To the authors'  credit, they report  a set of random-data  experiments 
in the paper. The results in table 4 strongly  reinforce  my reasons for 
discounting  the results  in table 3 and  figure  4. 
Just as I doubt that the authors' VAR analysis helps to explain 
exchange  rates in a meaningful  way, I doubt  that  it can help in assessing 
whether  exchange rates move "too much." With  a structural  model in 
hand, an analyst can either refute or support  assertions that exchange 
rates move too  much or are out of  alignment. Doing so  requires 
specification  of a counterfactual  scenario and of normative  criteria  for 
ranking  actual and counterfactual  outcomes. But the analytical  proce- 
dures  are conceptually  straightforward. 
With  only a VAR system of the sort  estimated  in this paper,  however, 
one cannot get a genuine handle  on such questions. The authors  them- 
selves acknowledge  this difficulty  at one point  in their  discussion. Later 
in their paper, however, when they ask specifically  whether  exchange 
rates  move disproportionately  in response  to large  changes  in economic 
variables,  they are tempted  to revert  to their  VAR systems and  to report 
a rough  test for nonlinear  response (table  6). The same basic difficulties 
exist with this rough  test, and  it is no more  revealing  than  the underlying 
VAR results. 
I reluctantly  conclude that in the VAR section of their paper the 
authors  have not provided  any dependable  evidence on why exchange 
rates move as they do and whether they move excessively. What is 
needed  is evidence  on determinants  of exchange  rates  in  a structural  sense. 
Despite an apparent  appeal  as a method  of avoiding  the difficulties  of an 
old-fashioned structural  approach, VAR systems are not capable of 
yielding  something  for nothing.  If we want  to make  structural  inferences, 
as we clearly  do, there  is no easy shortcut.2 
Shafer  and  Loopesko  are  understandably  constrained  from  advancing 
policy views very different  from those of the Federal  Reserve and the 
Reagan  administration.  Not being subject  to such constraints,  I want to 
state-incautiously-several  propositions  about  the implications  of ex- 
change-rate  variability  for policy. These propositions seem to me a 
reliable  anchor  for more  detailed  recommendations. 
There  are  two widely  held, somewhat  ideological  views about  changes 
2. The criticisms  of VAR analysis  made  here are developed  more systematically  in a 
recent paper  by Thomas  F. Cooley and Stephen  F. LeRoy, "Atheoretical  Macroecono- 
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in exchange rates. The first, most often encountered  in Europe  but also 
increasingly  popular  elsewhere,  is the minimum-variance  position.  Those 
holding  this view emphasize  the uncertainty  and  disruption  that may be 
associated with fluctuations  in exchange rates and argue that govern- 
ments should act to maintain  as much stability in exchange rates as 
possible. The second  view, the untrammeled-market  position,  holds  that 
every nation should  pursue  appropriate  domestic macroeconomic  poli- 
cies and then permit currency values to be freely determined  in the 
exchange  market  without  any intervention  by central  banks  and  govern- 
ments. 
Both of these traditional  positions  are analytically  deficient.  Variabil- 
ity in exchange rates is neither  good nor bad in itself. And its presence 
or absence should  not be a goal of national  macroeconomic  policy. 
The traditional  debate between the minimum-variance  and the un- 
trammeled-market  positions  has a polarized  character  that  is misleading. 
Policymakers  have no compelling reason to choose between fixed or 
flexible exchange rates. Since they do not have to make that choice, 
furthermore,  they should not make it. When  discussing  domestic mon- 
etary policy, economists do not have analogously polarized debates 
about interest-rate variability-at  least not to the same unfortunate 
degree. There is little pressure on policymakers to choose between 
minimum variability in interest rates and completely untrammeled 
variability.  Nor should there be. When debate occurs about excessive 
interest-rate  volatility, there  are few if any who challenge  the basic case 
for managed  variability  of some sort. 
A third  view about  exchange-rate  variability,  the insulation  position, 
was once very popular among economists. According to that view, 
"flexible exchange rates are a means of combining interdependence 
among countries through  trade with a maximum  of internal  monetary 
independence"  and  are a "means  of permitting  each country  to seek for 
monetary  stability  according  to its own lights, without  either imposing 
its mistakes  on its neighbors  or having  their  mistakes  imposed  on it." A 
sweeping  version of that view asserted  that  flexibility  in exchange  rates 
bottles up policy actions and nonpolicy disturbances  within the nation 
where they originate,  thereby  insulating  other  nations  from  their  conse- 
quences. A  more cautious version asserted only that flexible rates 
insulate  nations  from  each other's "monetary"  disturbances.3 
3. Milton Friedman,  "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," Essays  in Positive 
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As is now fairly  widely  recognized,  and  as Shafer  and  Loopekso note, 
this third  view is also analytically  deficient. It is simply not correct, in 
theory  or practice,  that  flexible  exchange  rates  can insulate  an economy 
from  disturbances  originating  abroad,  even from  monetary  disturbances. 
There is an element of truth in the conventional view about the 
insulating properties of flexible rates. For most if not all domestic 
macroeconomic policy actions taken abroad and for many types of 
nonpolicy  disturbances,  the effects spill over less  into the home nation 
if the home currency  is permitted  to appreciate  in response to external 
stimuli  that  are expansionary  and  to depreciate  in response  to those that 
are contractionary.  But this element of truth does not constitute an 
unqualified  recommendation  in favor  of more  rather  than  less variability 
in exchange rates. For one thing, the buffering  tendencies  of variability 
do not apply  to all types of disturbances  originating  abroad.  Even more 
important,  the buffering  tendencies associated  with exchange  rate vari- 
ability  are not always beneficial.  (For  example,  policymakers  should  not 
want to be insulated  from the rest of the world  in periods  dominated  by 
disturbances  originating  within  the real sectors of their  own economy.) 
Still another  common  attitude  about  exchange  rate  arrangements  has 
been to assert that  one or another  type of exchange  rate system imposes 
constraints  on policy decisions. Before 1973  it was widely believed that 
the obligation  of maintaining  a par value tends to "discipline" policy- 
makers  and constructively  constrain  their  choices about  domestic  poli- 
cies. The advocates of floating,  using a similar  argument  to advance an 
opposite policy recommendation,  claimed that the decision to float 
would provide  independence  for domestic policies. More recently, one 
frequently  hears  the assertion  that  a system of flexible  exchange  rates is 
a major  constraint  on domestic policies. 
All these assertions and counterassertions, however, tend to be 
misleading.  It is neither  fixed  exchange  rates  nor  flexibility  of those rates 
that impose constraints  on domestic  policies. Exchange  rates per se are 
not the central influence. Rather, it is the openness of the economy- 
the magnitude  and pattern  of international  transactions-that puts gen- 
uine constraints on what can be done with domestic policies. The 
autonomy of  national policies, furthermore, is  undermined  by the 
openness of the economy no matter  what  happens  to exchange  rates. 
Shafer  and  Loopesko observe that  the past  ten years  would  have been 
difficult  to live through  under  any exchange  rate  arrangements.  I would 
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ments under  which the 1973-75  and 1979-80  oil shocks would not have 
had traumatic  consequences. It is impossible to imagine  any arrange- 
ments that would not have transmitted  major  inflationary  and contrac- 
tionary  impetuses back and forth among  the major  economies. I doubt 
that the competence and appropriateness  of domestic macroeconomic 
policies in the past ten years was much influenced,  positively or nega- 
tively, by the exchange rate arrangements  that actually  existed, or that 
those policies would have been greatly improved under any other 
arrangements.  For the same reasons, the next ten years in the world 
economy are likely to be difficult  no matter  what  exchange  rate  arrange- 
ments are in place. 
Intervention  in the exchange market is not an unimportant  issue, 
despite the points  just made. Current  U.S. policy about intervention  is 
rigid  and verges on a theological  adherence  to the untrammeled-market 
position. It would be preferable  for the United States to take a more 
eclectic stance  toward  intervention  for U.S. account  and  to adopt  a more 
forthcoming  position about cooperative intervention  with foreign  gov- 
ernments. (The discussion of intervention  by Shafer and Loopesko is 
consistent with this recommendation,  but they refrain from openly 
criticizing  current  U.S. policy.) 
Even though  U.S. intervention  policy needs to be modified,  it would 
be wrong  to expect a great  deal  from  that  change  alone. Indeed,  the most 
important  modification  in policy that is needed is for the United States 
and foreign governments  to refine their overly simple attitudes. Inter- 
vention policy and exchange rate arrangements  are secondary rather 
than primary  issues. The basic macroeconomic  problems  troubling  the 
United States will remain,  and cause headaches  of roughly  comparable 
intensity, regardless of  what is  done with intervention policy and 
exchange rate arrangements.  It is thus a mistake to allow the manner 
and degree of variability  in exchange rates to be seen as, in itself, an 
issue of overriding  importance. 
Rudiger Dornbusch: Various studies that have appeared  in the past 
year, in particular  the work of Meese and  Rogoff, have documented  the 
failure  of structural  macroeconomic  models to explain the facts about 
exchange rates in a satisfactory manner.1  Indeed, a random  walk is 
1. Richard  A. Meese and Kenneth  Rogoff, "Empirical  Exchange  Rate  Models  of the 
Seventies:  Do  They  Fit Out of  Sample?"  Journal of International  Economics,  vol.  14 
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shown to be preferable  to structural  models in predicting  rates. In the 
field of exchange rate economics analysts have reached the point at 
which the stock market  literature  arrived  some years earlier. Against 
this background,  Shafer  and  Loopesko set out to investigate  what is left 
of exchange rate economics and to determine  what inferences can be 
made  for exchange  rate  policy. 
The paper presents a refreshing  approach  that blends market  com- 
mentary and the centerpieces of  exchange rate models. It  studies 
episodes rather  than trying  to explain (where  others had already  failed) 
all the evidence in a uniform  way. The authors immediately  dismiss 
purchasing power parity as a plausible model to explain short-run 
developments  in exchange rates and appropriately  give emphasis  to the 
difference in adjustment speeds between goods markets and asset 
markets,  to the risk  premium,  and  to the current  account. 
The dismissal  of purchasing  power parity  that now has become well 
established  is one of the important  insights  we have gained  from  the ten- 
year experience with floating  rates and from a more thoughtful  review 
of earlier  episodes. It was believed that  exchange  rates might  not follow 
purchasing  power parity  except during  periods  dominated  by monetary 
disturbances.  Now the evidence leads to a much stronger  argument:  in 
the case of monetary  disturbances  in particular,  large  systematic  devia- 
tions from  purchasing  power  parity  are  observed. This was dramatically 
illustrated  during  the German  hyperinflation  after World  War  I. And it 
appears  whenever monetary  instability  dominates:  for instance, in the 
experience of the United Kingdom  or in the U.S.  real exchange rate 
since 1979.  The prices of U.S. manufactured  goods relative  to the dollar 
prices of other nations are today 20 to 30 percent  higher  than  the 1973- 
82 average. That represents  a very striking  departure  from purchasing 
power parity,  the reason  for which is to be found in the monetary-fiscal 
policy mix. 
There  are two central  conclusions  of the paper.  First,  the sticky-price 
asset-market model provides a relatively satisfactory framework to 
explain the broad pattern  of exchange rate movements, at least in the 
cases of the dollar-yen  and the dollar-mark.  Second, there is no striking 
evidence of exchange  rate  effects through  risk  premiums  and  the current 
account, although on occasion these factors may have residually  ac- 
counted for some of the experience. The combination  of these two 
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presumption  that exchange  rates have moved in an unaccountable  way, 
and for that reason an active exchange rate policy does not appear 
imperative. However, because there is some evidence that sterilized 
intervention might work and that deviations from equilibrium  real 
exchange rates persist, the issue of whether to pursue a more active 
exchange market  policy remains  open. 
Shafer and Loopesko offer two kinds of evidence on the success of 
structural  models in explaining exchange rate developments. One is 
evidence from a vector autoregressive (VAR) representation  of the 
exchange rate  focused on the macroeconomy.  The VARs are estimated 
for seven variables,  with exchange  rates placed  last, and the results  are 
used to determine  the role of the "fundamentals"  from  popular  models 
in accounting  for the variance  in the forecast  error.  The exercise shows 
that the fundamentals-innovations in money, prices, output, interest 
rates, and trade balances-account  for only a small portion of the 
forecast-error  variance for the short-term  horizon, with the portion 
accounted  for reaching  60 percent  only after  two years or more. 
The variance  decomposition  that  the authors  show is interesting,  but 
their  interpretation  is misleading.  VARs  cannot  help, except by assump- 
tion, to identify the structural  errors that give rise to exchange rate 
innovations. From the VAR estimation procedure  it is clear that the 
innovation in the exchange rate equation is an amalgam  of the error 
terms  in  all  the structural  regressions  representing  the  news 2 Innovations 
in prices, output, or money are simply responses to combinations  of 
these primitive  innovations. The decomposition  of the variance  in the 
forecast  error  therefore  does not help to allocate  forecast  error  variance 
to such phenomena  as shifts in money demand,  transitory  fiscal expan- 
sion, strikes, a blip in the wage equation,  or an oil price shock. Because 
most of the variables  used in the VAR  representation  (certainly  the trade 
balance,  for  example)  cannot  be thought  of as predetermined,  the  analysis 
really  does not succeed in linking  changes  in exchange  rates  to news. 
The authors conclude from their VAR analysis that fundamentals 
account for only about 60 percent of exchange rate movements. That 
conclusion is certainly not warranted.  Forward-looking  models of the 
exchange rate based on rational expectations show that anticipated 
2. See Thomas  F. Cooley and Stephen  F. LeRoy, "Atheoretical  Macroeconomics:  A 
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future movements in fundamentals  affect the current exchange rate. 
News relevant  to these future values of the fundamentals  need not be 
correlated  with the current  realizations  of the particular  regressors  that 
are used. The failure  to explain exchange rates by structural  models or 
by VAR analysis thus comes down to our inability to track these 
expectations, not necessarily  to a failure  of the models. 
There are other reasons why I view this particular  VAR approach 
with reservations. First, the entire analysis is excessively bilateral.  It 
focuses only on two countries  at a time and  assumes  implicitly  that  there 
are  no important  multilateral  interactions  through  trade  flows  or through 
the world capital market. Data scarcity may have precluded a more 
generous specification, but that only means the exercise cannot be 
conducted meaningfully.  The same is true for other important  omitted 
variables  such as wealth. It would be interesting  to know, for example, 
whether stock market  prices play an important  role in exchange rate 
determination, as  one would expect from portfolio models. I also 
discount the empirical  results because, if there are important  linkages 
between the interest  rate and exchange  rate, the 1979  change  in Federal 
Reserve operating  procedures  is certain  to have affected the relations 
among  innovations,  interest  rates, and  exchange  rates, which  makes  the 
assumption  of an unchanging  stochastic  process hard  to accept. 
The second kind of empirical  evidence supporting  structural  models 
concerns the link between real interest rate differentials  and the real 
exchange rate. The authors note that the real interest differential, 
(r -  r*), is equal to the expected  rate of change of the real exchange 
rate, 
(1)  r=  r* +  zq, 
where q  = p*  +  e  -  p is the log of the real exchange  rate and p and e 
are  the logs of the  price  level and  the nominal  exchange  rate,  respectively. 
Assuming now that the real exchange rate, following a disturbance, 
converges asymptotically  to its long-run  equilibrium,  q, yields 
(2)  Aq =  v(q -  q) 
or, combining  equations 1 and 2, 
(3)  q = wqi-r(r  - r*)iv. 
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with foreign  rates exceeding those at home, the relative  price  of foreign 
goods will be high and falling. The model carries the assumption of 
perfect asset substitution,  and  the evidence is offered  in figure  5. 
The authors express qualified  satisfaction  with the findings  for the 
case of the dollar-mark  and the dollar-yen  exchange rates, though not 
with the dollar-pound  sterling  rate. I am not certain by what criterion 
they  judge their  success, except to note that  in the regression  for the first 
two cases the  linkage  between  interest  differentials  and  the real  exchange 
rate  is indeed  significant  and  of the sign indicated  by the theory. But it is 
also true that these regressions  perform  well only if the 1980-82 period 
is included and that they show little stability in a sample for a longer 
period. It is also worth noting that the coefficients of the interest 
differential  reported  in the regressions  show values of 2 to 3 for 1/v.  Thus 
the mean  lag, (1 -  v)/v, would  be of the order  of one and  one-half  years. 
These results  are  certainly  out of line with  the conjecture  that  disequilib- 
riums  in real exchange  rates that persist  for long periods, say ten years, 
account  for the patterns  in the real  exchange  rate and  real  interest  rate. 
The model for the real interest  rate  does well in explaining  that  a rise 
in U.S. interest  rates should  lead to an appreciation  of the real  exchange 
rate. But it fails when it predicts  that the real exchange  rate should  also 
be depreciating.  That has not in fact been happening,  and a theory is 
needed that will explain why the dollar-real or nominal-is  both high 
and stuck. I believe fiscal policy may provide  an answer. In the United 
States the prospective  full-employment  deficits  have increased  greatly; 
abroad  they remain  unchanged  or even decline. The effect is a rise in 
world  aggregate  demand  at full employment.  Moreover,  although  world 
aggregate  demand  has increased, there has also been a relative rise in 
the  demand  for  U. S. goods because  the  fiscal  expansion  that  has  occurred 
in the United States has led to relatively  larger  increases  in spending  on 
U.S. goods, though of course there are also spillover effects abroad. 
One thus expects the full-employment  real interest  rate-the  long-term 
rate-to  increase in the world to restore the balance between world 
spending  and world  full-employment  income. At the same time the real 
exchange  rate  of the dollar  will  appreciate  to eliminate  the relative  excess 
demand  for U.S. goods. 
The diagram  below illustrates  these points. On the axes I show the 
world  real interest  rate, r, and the relative  price of U.S. goods (the real 




to the  full-employment  supply.  Higher  real  interest  rates  depress  demand 
and therefore require an offsetting real depreciation  to maintain  full 
employment.  Similarly,  along  I* there  is full  employment  abroad.  Higher 
interest  rates  reduce  demand  and  require  a real  appreciation  of the dollar 
to maintain  full employment  abroad.  A U.S. fiscal  expansion,  by raising 
the demand  for U.S. goods, shifts  the equilibrium  schedule  of the goods 
market  upward  and to the left. A new equilibrium  obtains at point E' 
with a higher  world  interest  rate  and a real  appreciation  of the dollar. 
These prospective changes in interest rates and exchange rates are 
anticipated  under  rational  expectations  and show up in higher  long-term 
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of assets markets,  however, makes  recovery  much  more  difficult.  If this 
analysis  is correct,  a move toward  smaller  long-run,  not cyclical, deficits 
would lead to a collapse of the dollar. The analysis emphasizes the 
peculiar  and  central  effects of fiscal  policy  under  flexible  exchange  rates. 
This is a point Shafer  and Loopesko indeed  recognize,  although  they do 
not go beyond sketching  an interesting  framework  for a more complete 
investigation  of fiscal policy. 
The authors  are cautious in their assessment of the experience with 
floating  exchange  rates, and they are equally  cautious  in offering  policy 
advice. They do not conclude, for example, that  flexible  rates  played  an 
important  part  in the deterioration  of macroeconomic  performance  and 
in the growth  of protectionism.  Nor do they argue  forcefully either for 
intervention  or against  it. Now only few fully committed  supporters  of 
floating  rates remain.  But criteria  are still lacking  by which to form the 
judgment that flexible rates have been a bad experience, just as we 
confidently  announce  that  the Bretton  Woods system was poor. 
Shafer  and Loopesko do not express a strong  view on intervention. 
They believe some intervention may be desirable in some circum- 
stances. But, for instance, would they advocate using it to alter the 
present  dollar  exchange  rate? 
General Discussion 
C. Fred Bergsten  pointed  out that, while much  of the attention  in the 
paper  and comments was devoted to the possibility  of excess volatility 
in exchange rates, the possible misalignment  of exchange rates was of 
greater concern. These two issues are frequently mixed up in formal 
discussions, though they are conceptually quite distinct. In current 
policy discussions much of the present rationale  for intervention in 
exchange markets has to do with maintaining  relative stability of ex- 
change rates, or what is usually referred  to as "leaning against the 
wind." Yet often such intervention  results  in slowing  down  the required 
adjustment  process as rates head toward their equilibrium  values. He 
noted that the Germans had intervened in January 1983 to slow the 
appreciation  of their currency  against  the dollar.  This intervention  was 
in keeping  with the accepted  international  practice  of leaning  against  the 
wind  but  was the opposite  of what  was required  to achieve  a fundamental 
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George  von Furstenberg  responded  that  we may  know  less than  some 
people  think  about  what  alignment  of exchange  rates  is appropriate.  The 
German  election results in early 1983 would appear  to have removed 
uncertainty  about the future of German  policy, yet the deutsche mark 
subsequently  fell against  other currencies.  Relatively high real interest 
rates, which were presumed  to have overvalued  the dollar,  have melted 
away, but the dollar stubbornly  persists in being "overvalued." U.S. 
budget  deficits  are presumed  to contribute  to the strong  dollar,  but even 
larger  deficits in Japan apparently  have no similar  effect on the yen. 
Robert  Lawrence  disagreed  with the statement  that  even well-informed 
specialists could not predict the impact of fiscal policy on exchange 
rates. He observed that Japan  and the United Kingdom  have actually 
tightened  their fiscal policies, while the United States has loosened its 
policies. The consequences on the relative values of the yen, pound 
sterling,  and dollar have been the expected ones. Edmund  Phelps also 
commented  on the relation  between  fiscal  policy and  exchange  rates. An 
anticipated increase in future government  expenditure will raise the 
anticipated  future value of the local currency  and thus strengthen  the 
currency  immediately.  He reasoned that this effect, together with tax 
liberalizations  that  have raised  the real  rate  of interest,  may help  explain 
the current  strength  of the dollar. 
Even assuming  that  the  authorities  knew  in  what  direction  they  wanted 
to move exchange rates, William  Nordhaus noted that recent studies 
cast doubt  on the feasibility  of sterilized  intervention-buying or selling 
foreign exchange without affecting  either country's money supply. He 
argued  that evidence suggests the effect of such intervention  is exceed- 
ingly small. This result parallels  the historical  experience  with "Opera- 
tion Twist" under the regime of fixed exchange rates in the 1960s. 
Operation  Twist represented  an attempt  to alter the term structure  of 
interest  rates so that short-term  rates would be high, to attract  funds to 
the United States, while long-term  rates would be kept low so as to 
stimulate  investment. However, the scale of the required  intervention, 
even to change  relative  interest  rates  by a few basis points, discouraged 
authorities  from  a large-scale  Operation  Twist. 